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Abstract: This paper analyzes the evolving architecture for the prudential supervision of 
banks in the euro area. It is primarily concerned with the likely effectiveness of the SSM as a 
regime that intends to bolster financial stability in the steady state.  
By using insights from the political economy of bureaucracy it finds that the SSM is 
overly focused on sharp tools to discipline captured national supervisors and thus under-
incentives their top-level personnel to voluntarily contribute to rigid supervision. The suc-
cess of the SSM in this regard will hinge on establishing a common supervisory culture that 
provides positive incentives for national supervisors. In this regard, the internal decision 
making structure of the ECB in supervisory matters provides some integrative elements. Yet, 
the complex procedures also impede swift decision making and do not solve the problem 
adequately.  Ultimately,  a  careful  design  and  animation  of  the  ECB-defined  supervisory 
framework and the development of inter-agency career opportunities will be critical. 
The ECB will become a de facto standard setter that competes with the EBA. A likely 
standoff in the EBA’s Board of Supervisors will lead to a growing gap in regulatory integra-
tion between SSM-participants and other EU Member States.  
Joining the SSM as a non-euro area Member State is unattractive because the cur-
rent legal framework grants no voting rights in the ECB’s ultimate decision making body. It 
also does not supply a credible commitment opportunity for Member States who seek to 
bond to high quality supervision. 
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1  EUROPE’S HAMILTONIAN MOMENT? 
The sovereign debt crisis in the euro area has been regarded as an event that 
could prompt closer fiscal integration in the E.U. that would potentially resemble 
Alexander Hamilton’s debt assumption plan of 1790.1 In fact, the impetus to retroac-
tively cure a perceived defect of the European Monetary Union (EMU)2 seems to be 
much stronger than  the historical  catalyst for the U.S. developments that started 
with Hamilton’s original proposal:  the unsustainable debt burden of U.S. states at 
the time amounted to 13.39% of GDP, which is why its assumption raised prospec-
tive federal debt-levels to no more than 42.29% of GDP,3 whereas today, the Mem-
ber States of the euro area alone owe an amount equivalent to 92.2% of GDP.4 Yet, 
precisely these staggering numbers  also explain the reluctance of governments in 
fiscally rather strong E.U. Member States5 when it comes to confronting their ele c-
torate with bolder leaps towards an encompassing economic, fiscal and political inte-
gration of the euro area : prima vista they could be misrepresented as an uncondi-
tional bail-out of irresponsible foreigners, a view that would be oats for populist op-
position parties. The political economy hence suggests that a pragmatic approach of 
piecemeal integration is the most sensible real world option to progress in the cur-
rent mêlée.6 
                                            
1 For an astute analysis of the latter’s preconditions and impact cf. Henning and Kess-
ler (2012). 
2 For pre-sovereign solvency crisis contributions that argued for addi ng a banking 
component to the EMU model  Čihák and Decressin (2007, p. 7-12), Véron (2007, p. 4-6).  
The general theory of optimum currency areas that typically considers close fiscal integra-
tion with a common transfer mechanism an essential precondition for successful currency 
areas originates with Mundell (1961), McKinnon (1963) and Kenen (1969). For a survey of 
the literature see Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1996).  
3 Sylla (2011, p. 67); Johnston and Williamson (2013). 
4 eurostat (2013). 
5 Although, in line with common sentiment the highest ratios of government debt to 
GDP at the end of the first quarter of 2013 were recorded in Greece (160.5%), Italy 
(130.3%), Portugal (127.2%) and Ireland (12 5.1%), it is worth noting that both France 
(91.9%) and Germany (81.2%) exhibit debt to GDP-ratios (eurostat, 2013) in the vicinity or 
even beyond the 90%-threshold that was regarded as a peril to long -term prosperity in an 
influential, yet contested contribution, cf. Reinhart and Rogoff (2010); but see also Herndon 
et al. (2013). 
6 For an account of the broader  political agenda of the European “four presidents” 
see Van Rompuy et al. (2012). On the dense intertwining of a successful banking union 
with reinforced fiscal and political integration in Europe, Pisani-Ferry et al. (2012, p. 15, 
19); Véron (2012, p. 3-4). - 3 - 
 
Political leaders’ pledge to 
establish  a  European  banking 
union7  which would  ensure an 
impartial and uniform implemen-
tation  of  a  stringent  regulatory 
and  supervisory  framework  for 
all euro area banks could, if ulti-
mately fulfilled,  lead to a we l-
come contribution.8 Of course, a 
set of  stringent substantive rules 
that  govern   banks’  operations 
and  risk-taking  behavior,  an  ef-
fective  and  rigorously  enforced 
supervisory and resolution regime together with common safety nets (i.e. a reliable 
deposit guarantee scheme and clearly defined central bank lender of last resort obli-
gations)9 arguably cannot do much to cure the current woes, 10 but are apt to make 
future calamities less likely and limit their impact.  
                                            
7 The catchword refers to a centralization of pivotal instruments of banking policy on 
the supranational level which serves to preserve and advance the integration of the Europe-
an (euro area) banking system. 
8 On the general desirability of a euro area banking union, see e.g. Goyal et al. (2013, 
p. 7-10); Pisani-Ferry et al. (2012, p. 3 -4); Véron (2012, p. 2). To be sure, even beyond a 
common currency, the goal of market integration can militate in favor of a mutualization of 
banking policy among the 28 Member States of the E.U., for a discussion see Pisani-Ferry et 
al. (2012, p. 7). 
9 For an analysis of the individual components an expedient banking union should 
feature (figure 1) Goyal et al. (2013, p. 7-8, 12-20), Pisani-Ferry et al. (2012, p. 6-15). Politi-
cal statements are somewhat murky when it comes to DGS and don’t even mention lender 
of last resort duties, European Commission (2012a, p. 7-8), Van Rompuy (2012, p. 4). In 
fact, as a reaction to predictable political headwind from certain Member States who fear a 
far-reaching mutualization of liabilities and the asymmetric sharing of costs, the creation of 
a common DGS is no longer a Council priority, cf. European Council (2012a, p. 4). Equiva-
lent conflicts may delay enacting a resolution regime with common funding of backstops to 
combat systemic events. On the other hand, the harmonized set-up of substantive banking 
regulation has been adopted recently, cf. Directive 2013/36 of the European Parliament and 
of the Council on access to the activity of credit institutions and the prudential supervision 
of credit institutions and investment firms, amending Directive 2002/87/EC and repealing 
Directives 2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC, 2013 O.J. (L 176) 338 [hereinafter: CRD IV] and 
Regulation  575/2013  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  on  prudential  re-
quirements  for  credit  institutions  and  investment  firms  and  amending  Regulation  (EU) 
No 648/2012, 2013 O.J. (L 176) 1 [hereinafter: CRR]. 
10 Some commentators see the banking union’s potential contribution to ongoing cri-
sis-management in the removal of tail-risks and contingent sovereign liabilities, e.g. Goyal et 
al. (2013, p. 5, 9-10, 20, 26). Yet, this depends on how the banking union relates to “legacy 
assets”, to wit whether direct ESM-recapitalizations will become available for balance sheet 
risks incurred under national supervision prior to the SSM becoming operational, infra note 
39. 
figure 1 - elements of banking union - 4 - 
 
If regulatory intervention can indeed advance the goal of creating a more re-
silient financial system,11 its foremost feature has to be its effectiveness  as judged 
with particular regard to its stringent implementation and enforcement.12 Only the 
latter will reaffirm lost confidence in the  financial system’s stability as the indispen-
sable basis for sustainable credit-funded growth in the long run.13 The predicament 
of designing and launching the  Single Supervisory Mechanism ( SSM) as the first 
step14 towards a comprehensive banking union is that it potentially contributes to 
both combating the  ongoing sovereign debt crisis 15 as well as fostering the steady 
state in the long run.  
This paper is primarily concerned with the evolving architecture’s long-term 
prospects. In this context, increasing centralization must not always represent a val-
ue in itself, particularly so if it leads to hybrid forms that combine supranational 
dominance  with  persistent  inter-agency  cooperation.  The  evolving  institutional 
framework has to exhibit plausible advantages over available alternatives. The spe-
cific set of rules introduced has to be the plausibly superior option at hand to pro-
mote the overall objectives.16  
The recently reached political compromise on an operational set of rules for a 
SSM17 already raises doubts with regard to the effectiveness of the first pillar of the 
                                            
11 For a recent skeptical view that emphasizes the detrimental impact of complex 
regulation which diminishes the importance of reputation and substitutes it for technical 
expertise without restraining behavior in an equivalent, meaningful way Macey (2013, p. 
254-9). On the conventional rationale for prudential banking regulation and supervision 
Bhattacharya et al. (1998).  
12 Goyal et al. (2013, p. 8); Huertas (2012, p. 3); Wymeersch (2012, p. 4). 
13 To be sure, the banking union cannot counter fears associated with a Member 
State’s exit from the euro area that would impair deposits by way of re-denomination, Pisa-
ni-Ferry et al. (2012, p. 16). The ECB sought to address these anxieties revolving around the 
euro area’s integrity in the announcement of its Outright Monetary Transaction (OMT) pro-
gram, ECB (2012c). 
14 On the optimal phasing-in of the banking union itself, Pisani-Ferry et al. (2012, p. 
16-7); Goyal et al. (2013, 22-4). 
15 In this regard, it would arguably contribute already, if the SSM was established, 
because it would affirm political leaders’ commitment to do more to address the crisis than 
to present long-term visions, Pisani-Ferry et al. (2012, p. 15, 16). A more tangible advantage 
for crisis containment sometimes associated with the introduction of the SSM is contingent 
on the treatment of pre-existing debt overhangs (legacy liabilities), see infra note 39. Only if 
ECB-oversight  also  inaugurated  the  option  to  recapitalize  those  banks  that  accumulated 
their  losses  under  national  supervision  directly  with  funds  from  the  European  Stability 
Mechanism (ESM), could the SSM redound to calming markets: it has been argued, that 
immediate mutualization of systemic risks allowed adequate provisioning of impaired assets, 
thus buyed time for their value-preserving, post-crisis liquidation, an hence contributed to 
severing the bank-sovereign-link with its negative externalities Goyal et al. (2013, p. 9-10, 
20-21, 26). Others have proposed a clean and neat separation-scheme that contemplates 
mutualization only in the exceptional case of legacy liabilities exceeding a sovereign’s capac-
ity and under the precondition of clear cost-sharing agreements, Pisani-Ferry et al. (2012, p. 
16, 17). 
16 Goyal et al. (2013, p. 22) acknowledge that an “incoherent banking union” could 
result in “an architecture that is inferior to the current national-based one.” See also Pisani-
Ferry et al. (2012, p. 6) and infra 2.1. 
17 European Parliament (2013). - 5 - 
 
evolving regime. In fact, a closer look at both the events that triggered the legislative 
initiative (infra 2) and the distribution of competences between the European Cen-
tral Bank (ECB) and national competent authorities (NCAs) within the SSM (infra 
3) show that the new architecture was strongly influenced by availability heuristics 
and is thus more rooted in a mistrust vis-à-vis (captured)18 national supervisors than 
in the ambition to  provide an integrative framework that optimizes effective trans-
national supervision. Against this background, it comes as no surprise that the perti-
nent Regulation19 will be more concerned with  providing sharp tools to discipline 
reneging national authorities but may prove problematic when it comes to inducing 
optimal cooperation between the ECB  and non-opportunistic national supervisors. 
Yet, the latter remains vastly essential for the proper functioning of the new supervi-
sory framework and requires a careful fine-tuning of incentive structures within the 
SSM that may militate against effective decision -making procedures. Moreover, the 
ECB’s position within the SSM creates a de facto standard-setter alongside the Euro-
pean Banking Authority (EBA) which has the potential to countervail the goal of 
incrementally increasing the uniformity of actually observed supervisory practices in 
the E.U. as a critical component of the single market for financial services (infra 4). 
Finally,  the  reserved  assessment  is  amplified  if  the  attractiveness  of  the  SSM  is 
gauged from the vantage of non-euro area Member States who may thus abstain 
from joining the SSM although their participation is desirable to facilitate market 
integration in the E.U. (infra 5).   
2  THE SUMMER OF 2012  
It is long established that bank and sovereign debt crises constitute events that 
have the potential for mutual reinforcement.20 Against this background the banking 
union was explicitly initiated as a tool to “break the vicious cycle between banks and 
sovereigns”.21 However, its specific design is best understood if the actual triggering 
events are scrutinized more closely.  
2.1  THE  DISINTEGRATION  OF  THE EMU  AND  THE  RE-FRAGMENTATION  OF  THE  IN-
TERNAL MARKET FOR FINANCIAL SERVICES 
                                            
18 The concept describes how and when interest groups dominate regulatory decision 
processes  Laffont and  Tirole  (1991); with  a  particular  view  to  banking  regulators  Hardy 
(2006). 
19 The trilogue between Parliament, Commission and Council led to a compromise 
(cf. European Parliament, 2013) that translated into the  Proposal for a Council Regulation 
Conferring Specific Tasks on the European Central Bank Concerning Policies Relating to the 
Prudential Supervision of Credit Institutions  of July 1, 2013, Council Document 9044/13.  
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/13/st09/st09044.en13.pdf  [hereinafter:  SSM 
Regulation]. 
20 German Council of Economic Advisors (2011, p. 137-8); Tröger (2013, p. 189-90). 
For empirical evidence from the euro area see Gerlach, Schulz, and Wolff (2010) who iden-
tify an aggregate risk factor sensitive to both bail -out likelihood/magnitude  and fiscal 
strength as main determinant of sovereign spreads. 
21 European Council (2012b). - 6 - 
 
In fact, it was the reoccurrence of mutually reinforcing twin crises that ulti-
mately  overrode  the  political  resistance  against  a  more  incisive  centralization  in 
banking regulation and supervision. The summer of 2012 saw increasing and persis-
tent sovereign and private sector imbalances as a sign of a critical disintegration of 
the EMU. Return spreads for euro area government bonds widened and money and 
capital market rates incrementally diverged across the euro area.22 These develop-
ments impeded the implementation of a uniform monetary policy within the EMU, 
as, for  instance, slashes in monetary policy rates had little or no effect in certain 
Member States.23  Banks’  cost  of  doing  business  hinged  partly  upon  their  home 
Member State’s fiscal strength and the consequential credibility of its backstops, thus 
establishing a pro-cyclically link between private and sovereign borrowing costs.24  
This observable loss of a  level playing field for the provision of financial se r-
vices in the internal market could be attributed to the general deterioration of confi-
dence in the viabili ty of the banking sector  that brought Member States’ bail-out 
capacity to the fore.25 Leaving immediate crisis containment a side,26 the long-term 
counterstrategy to revamp trust in financial institutions  in the steady state required 
inter alia no more than effective prudential supervision and an operable resolution 
regime that would impede future build-ups of risk concentrations apt to undermine 
systemic stability. Put differently, it called for centralization only if  and where the 
alternatives were per se less effective. Clearly, tasking an institution on the suprana-
tional level that is entirely unseasoned in pertinent regard does not provide an a r-
gument in itself.27 
It seems intuitive, though, that the incrementally transnational character of 
contemporary banking should be traced by an equivalent supervisory architecture , 
that minimizes negative cross-border externalities.28 Cross-country comparisons, a 
broader information base, and the  lower susceptibility to national preferences 29 
could constrain the build -up of excessive risk concentrations in good times .30  In 
times of crises, a transnational perspective would counter  desires to cut foreign ac-
                                            
22 ECB (2012a, p. 17-28, 31-35). 
23 For the ECB’s assessment see ECB (2012b). See also Goyal et al. (2013, p. 6 figures 
2 and 3); Pisani-Ferry & Wolff (2012, p. 7-12). 
24 Goyal et al., (2013, p. 7). 
25 Angeloni and Wolff (2012). 
26 See supra note 39. 
27 Ferran & Babis (2013, p. 11) point to the ECB’s missing track-record as a supervi-
sor and conclude that there is „absolutely no guarantee that the ECB will do a better job in 
supervision than many national supervisors“. 
28 Pisany-Ferry et al. (2012, p. 3-4); Goyal et al. (2013, p. 7, 8, 14). 
29 See also infra 3.3.2. 
30 Clearly though, informational advantages of a supranational supervisor only a c-
crue with regard to banks with  sizable cross-border operations, Pisani-Ferry et al. (2012, p. 
9). Of course, it is conceivable that parallel behavior and/or risk exposure of many small and 
medium sized, purely domestic institutions may pose systemic risks of wider proportions, 
Sapir et al. (2012, p. 3). Yet, such patterns can in principle also be identified by NCAs as the 
primary systemic risk occurs on domestic markets.   - 7 - 
 
tivities to stabilize the national banking system and would hence prevent the (re-
)fragmentation of financial markets.31  
However, the desirability of more centralization remained a matter of dispute 
among European politicians, not least because a banking union as a crisis response 
has  to  be  designed  carefully  with  regard  to  its  long-term  ramifications  for  pan-
European institutions. Ultimately, resistance crumbled only in light of the revela-
tions during the flaring Spanish and Cypriot banking crises.  
2.2  THE SPANISH (AND CYPRIOT) BANKING CRISIS AS THE STRAW THAT BROKE THE 
CAMEL’S BACK 
After the first rumors of a private sector participation in the efforts to reduce 
the Greek sovereign debt load to sustainable proportions had corrupted the confi-
dence in the viability of the European banking sector in July 2011,32 the EBA con-
ducted inter alia a capital exercise to calm the markets and gauged the overall need 
for additional own funds at  the relevant Spanish banks at € 26.17 bn.33 Yet, the 
bursting of the bubble in the residential construction market in May 2012 revealed 
that then nationalized Bankia S.A., the nation’s largest mortgage lender, needed to 
be bailed-out with a capital infusion of € 19 bn, after the Spanish government had 
converted an earlier € 4.5 bn rescue loan into voting stock.34 Over time it was r e-
vealed that obscuring accounting practices (dynamic provisioning, a.k.a. “cookie jar-
accounting”) and dubious pre-insolvency debt restructurings (liquidity management 
exercises), that were at least tolerated by the competent supervisor (Bank of Spain), 
had helped to disguise a problem that smoldered for years and ultimately required a 
massive reorganization of the troubled parts of the banking sector. Euro area Mem-
ber States provided additional funds of up to € 100 bn to back the bail-outs,35 with 
an initial transfer of € 39.5 bn from the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) occur-
ring in December 2012.36  
It was the repeated pattern of insufficient and delayed information, the politi-
cally induced lax  governance and  oversight,37 and the evident moral hazard pro b-
lems38 where an irresponsible national banking sector can rely on international aid,39 
                                            
31 SSM Regulation, art. 1(1) indeed explicitly deems preserving „the unity and integ-
rity oft he internal market“ a core aim of the SSM. For a discussion of this systemic ap-
proach that does not cater directly to individual depositors‘ interests, Wymeersch (2012, p. 
14). 
32 Tröger (2013, p. 190-1). 
33 EBA (2011b). 
34 Bjork and House (2012); Stubbington and Roman (2012). 
35 Forelle and Steinhauser (2012); Schaeffer Muñoz, Enrich, and Bjork (2012). 
36 Patnaude, A. (2012). 
37 On the unholy alliance of politicians, board members, and supervisors Anonymus 
(2013).  
38 Goyal et al. (2013, p. 12). 
39 It is an unresolved issue, how  “legacy assets” will be treated once the SSM enters 
into force. SSM Regulation, art. 33(4), prescribes an entrance exam in which the ECB as-
sesses at least those banks’ balance sheets that will henceforth fall under its direct supervi-
sion. However, despite the urgent case for transparency Pisani-Ferry et al. (2012, p. 15, 16), - 8 - 
 
that ultimately generated the political will to initiate a banking union among the 
euro area Member States at the end of June 2012.40 However, the prospective out-
come of the  legislatory process establishing the banking union’s first pillar will not 
be the comprehensive supranationalization of prudential supervision that was con-
sistently endorsed by the Commission.41 The political compromise for the SSM insti-
tutes the ECB as the de iure supreme overseer but relies de facto on NCAs to do the 
bulk  of the  daily  supervisory  work. In line with the incidents   that  eventually 
brought forth the SSM, the ECB will be more of a whipper-in for national supervi-
sors than an operationally autonomous, supranational watchdog.  The SSM is thus 
based on the premise that the most pressing problem in designing an effective s u-
pervisory architecture lies in overcoming the forbearance NCAs  may show vis-à-vis 
national champions (“home bias”).    
The following part of this paper will make this point in more detail. It thus 
prepares the ground for an assessment of the SSM’s probable operability and pro-
vides guidance for fine tuning some of its key features. 
3  DISTRIBUTION OF COMPETENCES WITHIN THE SSM AND BEYOND 
The  institutional  innovation  the  SSM  will  bring  can  be  best  understood  if 
compared to the general European supervisory architecture. Financial institutions 
today typically operate across national borders.42 As a consequence, their supervision 
raises specific challenges as sovereign authorities are bound to exchange information 
and cooperate closely. In the E.U. context, Member States banking laws that distrib-
ute competences among NCAs in cross-border scenarios are profoundly harmonized 
and accept some centralized decision-making power of the EBA (infra 3.1). For the 
euro area the SSM constitutes an island solution because it provides a degree of cen-
tralization on the supranational level unavailable elsewhere . Yet, even within the 
SSM NCAs will retain critical tasks in day-to-day supervision (infra 3.2). Hence, the 
overall assessment of the evolving regime turns out rather skeptical: the SSM is per-
vaded with cooperative elements in an essentially non -cooperative game  without 
paying close attention to the acting  public officers’, i.e. bureaucrats’ affirmative in-
centives that could induce much needed voluntary contribution and instead relies 
heavily on strong sanctioning powers. The direly needed elements to ameliorate the 
incentive  structures  partly  contradict  effective  decision-making  procedures  (infra 
3.3).  
                                                                                                                                        
it is unclear how those risks that have been incurred under national supervision, will be 
eliminated or hedged once the ECB uncovers them in the SSM-entrance exam.  
40 European Council (2012b). 
41 European Commission (2012b, p. 5).  Accordingly, the explanatory memorandum  
of the Commission Proposal for a Council Regulation Conferring Specific Tasks on the Euro-
pean Central Bank Concerning Policies Relating to the Prudential Supervision of Credit I n-
stitutions, COM (2012) 511 final, p. 5 [hereinafter: Commission Proposal SSM Regulation] 
stated:  “One  of  the  key  elements  of  the  banking  union  should  be  a  Single  Supervisory 
Mechanism (SSM) with direct oversight of banks, to enforce prudential rules in a strict and 
impartial manner and perform effective oversight of cross border banking markets.” 
42  On the efficiency rationale Moskow (2006, p. 4-5); Fiechter et al. (2011, p. 5). - 9 - 
 
3.1  SHARED RESPONSIBILITIES IN CROSS-BORDER SUPERVISION 
As table 1 indicates, the reformed CRD IV/CRR-framework for the prudential 
supervision of European banks43 relies on responsibilities shared between host and 
home Member States 44 with a limited, albeit buttressed role for the EBA that has 
gained momentum to settle—upon reference from a dissenting NCA—disputes that 
arise among home and host Member States’ supervisors.45 Moreover, the regime still 
depends critically on banks’ organizational choices, to wit, whether they conduct 
their foreign activities through a branch (legally dependent satellite) or a subsidiary 
(legally independent affiliate).46 
 
  Home Member State  Host Member State  EBA 
Subsidiary 
Structure 
Authorization and 
supervision of parent, CRD 
IV, arts. 8(1), 49(1) 
Consolidating supervision 
of group, CRD IV arts. 
49(2), 111(1) 
Authorization and 
supervision of legally 
independent subsidiaries 
in cooperation with 
consolidating supervisor 
(parent home Member 
State authority), CRD IV 
arts. 8(1), 49(1), 112(1) 
Participation in 
Binding decision if  
(i)  consolidating or host 
supervisor fail to carry 
out duties, CRD IV 
112(2) 
(ii)  consolidating and host 
supervisor cannot 
settle dispute, art. 
                                            
43  The  pertinent  European  rules  on  prudential  supervision  cover  mainly  deposit-
taking credit institutions (CRR, art. 4(1)(1)) and investment firms (CRR, art. 4(1)(2) and 
European Parliament and Council Directive 2004/39 on markets in financial instruments 
amending Council Directives 85/611/EEC and 93/6/EEC and Directive 2000/12/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council Directive 93/22/EEC, art. 
4(1)(1), 2004 O.J. (L 145) 1 [hereinafter: MiFID]), yet only the authorization of credit insti-
tutions, cf. CRD IV, arts. 8, 49. With regard to their banking affiliates financial holding com-
panies (CRR, art. 4(1)(20)), mixed financial holding companies (CRR, art. 4(1)(21)) and 
mixed-activity holding companies (CRR, art. 4(1)(22)) are included in consolidated supervi-
sion, cf. CRD IV, arts. 119 et seq. Financial firms that are included in national prudential 
bank regulation and supervision remain outside the E.U.’s regulatory grip.  
44 CRD IV, art. 3(1) subpara. 39, CRR, art. 4(1) subpara. 43 define the home Member 
State as that in which a financial institution was authorized. CRD IV, art. 3(1) subpara. 40, 
CRR, art. 4(1) subpara. 44 define the host Member State as that in which a financial institu-
tion has branches or provides services. Hence, strictly speaking, the home/host-terminology 
is restricted to branch-structures. Under a subsidiary-structure the (host) supervisor respon-
sible for the incorporated group -affiliates is referred to as “competent authority” whereas 
the (home) supervisor is termed “consolidating supervisor”, cf. e.g. CRD IV, art. 112. For 
simplicity, the home/host-terminology is used in a broader sense here and also encompasses 
Member States home to a parent institution and Member States hosting their subsidiaries.  
45 The EBA upon reference of disputes between home and host supervisors may u l-
timately compel NCAs to take specific actions/refra in from such actions  see  Regulation 
1093/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a European Supervi-
sory Authority (European Banking Authority), amending Decision No 716/2009/EC and 
repealing Commission Decision 2009/78/EC, art. 19, 2010 O.J. (L 331) 12 [hereinafter: EBA 
Regulation]. 
46  For a detailed description   of the pre -CRD IV/CRR legal framework ( Directive 
2006/48 of the European Parliament and the Council Relating to the Taking Up and Pursuit 
of the Business of Credit Institutions, 2006 O.J. (L 177) 1 [hereinafter Banking Directive] ) 
with particular regard to this pivotal distinction, see Tröger (2013, p. 202-13). - 10 - 
 
consolidating supervision, 
CRD IV art. 113(1)(2)  
113(3) CRD IV 
Branch 
Structure 
Authorization and 
supervision of bank, 
including foreign activities 
(onsite investigations, 
etc.), CRD IV art. 49(1), 
33, 41(1), 52 
No authorization (E.U. 
passport), CRD IV art. 17 
Supervision of liquidity 
endowment in cooperation 
with home supervisor, 
CRD IV arts. 156, 50 (2)(3) 
Closer cooperation, partic-
ularly  with  regard  to  li-
quidity  risks,  with  home 
supervisor  if  branch  is 
significant,  CRD  IV  art. 
51(2) 
Binding decision if  
(i)  home supervisor does 
not ensure banks’ 
compliance with CRD 
IV/CRR, CRD IV, art. 
41(2) 
(ii)  host supervisor seeks 
to take measures 
opposed by home 
supervisor, CRD IV art. 
50(4) 
(iii) home supervisor does 
not take operational 
steps required by CRD 
IV art. 86(11), CRD IV 
art. 51(2) 
table 1 - home-/host Member State competence and cooperation under CRD IV/CRR-framework 
This regime will remain unaltered with regard to all banks established outside 
the euro area, including those chartered in E.U. Member States that do not expressly 
opt-in to the SSM.47  In fact, in relation to non -participating Member States (and 
third countries) the ECB  will  only assume the role of host/home authority for 
branches and subsidiaries in the (consolidated) supervision  of transnational banks 
under CRD IV/CRR, SSM Regulation, arts. 17, 4(1)(b), 4(1)(f), and 4(2).48 It will car-
ry relatively more weight in colleges of supervisors as it will represent a more size a-
ble portion of the transnational group.49  
Even though common supervision in the euro area by its very nature can on-
ly have a limited reach, the SSM could have at least provided for an island-solution 
that abolished  both the distinction between branch /subsidiary-structures and the 
friction-prone cooperative elements. Yet, the SSM does neither level the differences 
entirely that arise from banks’ organizational choices, nor adhere to a strong model 
of supranational centralization50 that would expulse NCAs entirely from performing 
critical functions in prudential supervision. 
3.2  THE SSM 
In order to predict the effectiveness of the evolving regime and identify the 
mechanics that will prove important when it comes to fine-tuning the supervisory 
apparatus, this part scrutinizes relevant features of the SSM. With regard to supervi-
sion in the euro area, the ECB will become the predominant institution vested with 
                                            
47 SSM Regulation, art. 2(1). For the preconditions under which a “close cooperation 
between the ECB and the national competent authority” can be established for the pruden-
tial supervision none-euro area banks within the SSM see id., art. 7(2) and infra 5.1. 
48 Infra 3.2.3. 
49 Wymeersch (2012, p. 25). 
50 Ferrarini and Chiarella (2013, p. 20-1, 55-63). - 11 - 
 
broad powers to determine and oversee supervisory practices (3.2.1). Yet, in day-to-
day operations it will also depend in important respect on the input and commit-
ment of NCAs (3.2.2).51 Furthermore, the ECB’s power to shape supervisory practic-
es cannot override the substantive differences in prudential regulation that contin-
ues to hinge on whether cross-border banking groups’ operate through branches or 
subsidiaries and thus draws on a distinction that is partly unaligned with actual risk 
structures (3.2.3).     
3.2.1 THE ECB’S ROLE IN PRUDENTIAL SUPERVISION  
Originally, the Commission intended to establish the ECB as an omnipotent 
supranational watchdog at least for euro area credit institutions. The compelling ad-
vantage of tasking the ECB with supervisory obligations is that it rests on a relatively 
sound constitutional basis in the founding Treaty.
52 Moreover, vesting supervisory 
competences and powers with the ECB, instead of another supranational authority, 
will arguably create synergies with its mandate for monetary policy and lender of 
last resort duties.53 Yet, this is ambivalent, as the ECB’s dual mandate is also a source 
for difficult policy trade-offs (infra 6) that account for convoluted governance ar-
rangements (infra 3.3.2.1). 
From the outset, the SSM should not, and will not, cover all institutions sub-
ject to prudential regulation and supervision under CRD IV/CRR.54 Despite the sig-
nificantly broader scope of TFEU, art. 127(6) that also  pertains to financial institu-
tions,55 SSM supervision will be limited to credit institutions as defined in E.U. legis-
lation.56 Furthermore, even those credit institutions’ activities not covered by supra-
national prudential regulation will not fall within the remit of the SSM.57 This con-
tradicts lessons from the financial crisis of 2007/08 that exposed risks for financial 
stability that reside outside the traditional banking sector, 58 which led both the U.S. 
and the U.K. to more encompassing and flexible approaches in prudential superv i-
                                            
51 The institutional structure of the SSM resembles that of the Eurosystem that con-
sists of the ECB and national central banks (NCBs) of those Member States whose currency 
is the euro. 
52 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, art. 127(6), 2010 O.J. (C 83) 47 
[hereinafter: TFEU], Wymeersch (2012, p. 6-7, 8-9); Ferran and Babis (2013, p. 2-3); but 
see also Carmassi et al. (2012, p. 3-4); Wymeersch (2012, p. 24) who challenge the SSM’s 
openness to non-euro area Member States on legal grounds.   
53 Pisani-Ferry et al. (2012, p. 11); Goyal et al. (2013, p. 14). 
54 Supra note 43. 
55 Although secondary legislation cannot bind the interpretation of the TFEU, it is in-
dicative that CRR, art. 4(1) subpara. 26 defines the latter as “undertaking other than an in-
stitution, the principal activity of which is to acquire holdings or to pursue one or more of 
the” banking activities listed in CRD IV, Annex I, points 2 to 12 and 15.  
56 SSM Regulation, art. 1 subpara. 2. Commentators have pointed to possible tensions 
in consolidated supervision where the remit of national prudential banking regulation also 
encompasses, for instance non -deposit taking institutions that grant credit, Wymeersch 
(2012, p. 5). 
57 E.g. activities as central counterparties are explicitly exempt, SSM Regulation, art. 
1 subpara. 2. 
58 Gorton (2009a, 2009b). - 12 - 
 
sion.59 The SSM’s constriction to deposit taking institutions may in part be attributed 
to the fact that it is primarily geared towards intercepting the European feedback 
loop between banks and sovereigns. The broader agenda of implementing a regula-
tory framework for sustainable finance that is attuned to the lessons of the global 
financial crisis is pursued in parallel and may correct some of the current architec-
ture’s shortcomings.60     
According to the Commission’s concept, the ECB should be in charge of all 
the major tasks in prudential supervision, i.e. licensing and authorizing credit insti-
tutions, ensuring compliance with own funds requirements et al., monitoring inter-
nal capital adequacy assessment processes, verifying internal governance arrange-
ments,61 stress-testing etc.,
62 for all euro area banks. However, it was clear from the 
outset that the ECB would be in no position to brave  the gargantuan challenge of 
supervising the more than  6.000 banks in the euro area  on a stand-alone basis.63 
Instead, the Commission Proposal acknowledged, that “within the SSM national su-
pervisors  are in  many  cases  best placed  to carry  out  such  activities,  due  to  their 
knowledge of national, regional and local banking markets, their significant existing 
resources and to locational and language considerations, and therefore enable[d] the 
ECB to rely on national authorities to a significant extent.”64 Yet, with the ECB’s 
pervasive power to issue instructions vis-à-vis national competent authorities,
 65 the 
latter  were  basically  relegated  to  providing  auxiliary  assistance,66  policing money 
laundering prohibitions, and enforcing consumer protections.67  
During the legislative process the ECB’s role in direct supervision was con-
fined to the euro area’s most important financial institutions (table 2) and a stronger 
role for participating Member States’ competent authorities within the SSM was re-
installed under a “hub and spokes”-arrangement for less significant banks.  
                                            
59 Ferran and Babis (2013, p. 5-6); see also Wymeersch (2013, p. 17-8).  
60 For the initiatives regarding the shadow banking sector see European Commission 
(2012). 
61 Sapir et al. (2012, p. 4) have argued that vesting the competence to supervise 
banks‘ internal governance structures will be critical for the SSM’s overall effectiveness.  
62 Commission Proposal SSM Regulation, art. 4(1). Wymeersch (2012, p. 15) alludes 
to confusion if “matters will show up … that are not in the remit of the ECB”. However, 
supervisory responsibilities and related powers not explicitly conferred on the ECB remain 
at NCAs, SSM Regulation, art. 1(5), and arguably do not require centralization. E contrario, 
where supervisory responsibilities are indeed conferred on the ECB, no such responsibilities 
and related powers under national law persist in parallel. Overlapping or duplicated compe-
tences, as assumed by Ferran and Babis (2013, p. 12), cannot occur.  
63 But see also Goyal et al. (2013, p. 12) arguing that a banking union should aim at 
supranational supervision of  all  banks,  “regardless  of  size,  complexity  and  cross-border 
reach”; for an assessment, that advocates the centralized definition of baselines but allows 
differences in “size, activity and business model” to be accounted for in supervisory practices 
and competences Wymeersch (2012, p. 17). 
64 Commission Proposal SSM Regulation, Explanatory Memorandum, p. 5. 
65 Commission Proposal SSM Regulation, art. 5(4).   
66 For a detailed description cf. Wymeersch (2012, p. 13-4). 
67 Commission Proposal SSM Regulation, recital 22; Ferran and Babis (2013, p. 10). 
Wymeersch (2012, p. 5, 15-6) points to overlaps where aiding and abetting money launder-
ing or pervasive misselling may imperil confidence in a bank.  - 13 - 
 
characterization 
of financial in-
stitution 
SSM Regulation  Precondition for direct ECB supervisory compe-
tence 
significant  art. 6(4) subpara. 5  participating Member States’ three largest banks 
significant   art. 6(4) subpara. 2  (alternatively) bank’s 
i.  large size (presumed, if total assets > € 30 bn) 
ii.  importance  for  EU/Member  State’s  economy 
(presumed if total assets to GDP-ratio > 20% 
and total assets > € 5 bn) 
iii.  ECB  confirmation  of  participating  Member 
State  notification  indicating  significance  for 
domestic economy    
significant  art. 6(4) subpara. 3  ECB decision if bank has subsidiaries in at least two 
participating  Member  States  and  substantial  cross-
border activities (foreign to total assets/liability ratio) 
significant  art. 6(4)subpara. 4   direct EFSF/ESM recapitalization  
less significant  art. 6(5)(b)   ECB decision after consultation/on request of NCA if 
insufficient oversight (particularly, in case of indirect 
EFSF/ESM recapitalization)  
table 2 – direct ECB supervisory competence according to SSM Regulation 
Table 2 indicates that the rather nested manner in which the SSM Regulation 
distributes the supervisory competences within the SSM  should not blur the ECB’s 
considerable pull as the primary supervisor: according to preliminary estimates that 
applied only the quantitative criteria laid down in SSM Regulation art. 6(4) subpara. 
2 approximately 150 to 180 top financial institutions that account for 80 to 91% of 
the assets held by the industry in the euro area will fall under direct ECB supervi-
sion.68 It is important to note, that  the relevant criteria have to be applied at the 
highest level of consolidation,  i.e. subsidiaries of a significant parent institution are 
automatically regarded as significant themselves and will thus fall indiscriminately 
under direct ECB supervision.69  
It is a consequence of the sub-optimally coordinated phasing-in of the bank-
ing union in a rugged political process that the adequacy of the criteria applied to 
categorize banks (table 2) cannot be judged conclusively at the current stage. The 
policy considerations that should drive the decision which banks to include in direct 
supranational oversight are largely dependent on the function and design of the 
other institutions of a banking union (resolution regime, deposit insurance, bac k-
stops).70 Yet, it should be noted that the relevant criteria do not necessarily link d i-
rect ECB oversight to a bank’s significant cross-border operations, i.e. do not align it 
with comparative informational advantages a supranational supervisor necessarily 
                                            
68 Wolff and De Sousa (2012); Goyal et al. (2013, p. 15). 
69 SSM Regulation, art. 6(4) subpara. 1. See also infra 3.2.3.   
70 For a discussion see Pisani-Ferry et al. (2012, p. 9-10). - 14 - 
 
has (supra 2.1), although of course, size can be regarded as a rough proxy for trans-
national operations and interconnectedness. 
For all less significant banks, the system of NCAs’ shared responsibilities in 
prudential supervision under CRR/CRD IV (table 1) in principle remains untouched 
within the SSM.71 Notably, the authorization of credit institutions is conferred on the 
ECB regardless of an applicant’s significance.72 Similarly, the ECB, as a consequence 
of its mandate and expertise in financial stability issues, will have the power to de-
ploy macroprudential tools (capital buffers) with regard to all euro area banks even 
against NCAs’ objections.73 
However,  even  where  no  primary  ECB-competence  is  established,  ECB-
coordination and oversight is supposed to ensure enhanced consistency and integra-
tion of supervisory practices, i.e. the ECB shall safeguard the implementation of the 
supervisory approach that it observes in direct supervision at NCAs.74 To that end, 
the ECB will be empowered to issue regulations, guidelines, or general instructions 
to NCAs.75 Hence, it will have extraordinary clout to shape NCAs’ actual supervisory 
practices in great detail.76 The ECB-formulated framework will compel NCAs to noti-
fy the ECB in advance of any material supervisory procedure, further assess these 
procedures if the ECB so requests, and forward draft supervisory decisions for co m-
ments to the ECB.77 As a matter of law, the ECB will thus be able to control and in-
fluence supervisory practices virtually at the grass-roots level. Moreover, it will have 
to make exhaustive use of these competences, as  monitoring of the SSM’s proper 
operation  will  be  one  of  the  core  tasks  conferred  on  the  ECB  under  TFEU  art. 
127(6).78  To facilitate this assignment , the ECB  can not only   react to  ex ante-
approaches from NCAs, but also proactively request information concerning the per-
formance of their supervisory tasks.
79 Furthermore, it can verify or complement the 
                                            
71 SSM Regulation, art. 6(6).  
72 SSM Regulation, arts. 4(1)(a), 6(6). The ECB will grant bank licenses as proposed 
by NCAs in a “no objection” procedure, SSM Regulation, art. 14(2). It can withdraw author-
izations on a proposal from the NCA or on its own initiative, SSM Regulation, art. 14(5). In 
the latter case, as long as no SRM is in operation,  NCAs can object to the ECB withdrawal-
decision, if a delay is necessary to orderly resolve the institution or/and maintain financial 
stability, SSM Regulation, art. 14(6). 
73 SSM Regulation, art. 5(2), (4). For a critical assessment of such a centralization 
that contradicts NCAs’ idiosyncratic expertise in judging local markets, Véron (2012, p. 6). 
The concerns, that the ECB may henceforth assume an even more dominant position within 
the decision making process of the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB), Ferran and Babis 
(2013, p. 28-9), are unrelated to the ECB’s macroprudential tools as they simply follow from 
the ECB’s position in the ESRB’s General Board and participating Member States’ NCBs’ 
plausible tendency to follow the ECB in lockstep once the SSM is operable (see also infra 
4.2). 
74 Ferran and Babis (2013, p. 10). 
75 SSM Regulation, art. 6(5)(a). 
76 Ferran and Babis (2013, p. 11) observe that if the ECB -defined framework takes 
the form of “a very prescriptive supervisory handbook” it will annul most of the leeway to 
supervise in a judgment-led manner that accounts for local idiosyncrasies. 
77 SSM Regulation, art. 6(7)(c). 
78 SSM Regulation art. 6(5)(c). 
79 SSM Regulation art. 6(5)(e). - 15 - 
 
information received by using its investigatory powers vis-à-vis euro area banks that 
allow  inter  alia  information  requests,  general  investigations,  offsite  diligence  and 
(judicially authorized) onsite inspections.80  
Finally, NCAs will also be coerced to cautiously maneuver within the ECB-set 
framework for the prudential supervision of the euro area’s less significant banks, as 
they will face the permanent and pervasive threat of being ousted as competent su-
pervisor by the ECB. SSM Regulation art. 6(5)(b) vests power with the ECB to as-
sume at any time on its own initiative the competence to directly supervise less sig-
nificant  banks  if  their  supervision  falls  short  of  the  consistent  high  supervisory-
standards the SSM is supposed to adhere to, particularly where these institutions 
benefit  from  indirect  recapitalizations  with funds  from  supranational  coffers.81  Of 
course, this may prove an empty threat if the ECB does not have sufficient resources 
at its disposal that enable it to actually supplant ailing NCAs a nd take over all their 
tasks immediately.82 Yet, neglecting shaky banks’ monetary restrictions, at least re-
trieving the pertinent costs will be possible: The ECB will levy cost-covering annual 
fees from supervised credit institutions83 and can thus recover expenditures incurred 
from preempting a NCA in the supervision of less significant banks.   
Yet, the pertinent feature of the legal set -up adds to the overall picture that 
sees the ECB as the sole guarantor of the consistent, impartial and stringent supervi-
sion of euro area financial institutions and exhibits a general mistrust towards NCAs 
as a direct function of the events that brought about the sweeping institutional r e-
forms (supra 2.2). In sum, the ECB as the SSM’s primary supervisor will be provided 
with heavy sticks, yet the carrots for NCAs seems missing.  
3.2.2 INTERPLAY WITH NCAS 
                                            
80 SSM Regulation, arts. 6(5)(d), 10-13. 
81 The wording of SSM Regulation, art. 6(5)(b) could be interpreted as empowering 
the ECB to exercise supervisory powers in individual incidents. Yet, to ensure the proper 
functioning of the SSM where NCAs are in charge, the ECB already can rely on its right to 
instruct NCAs to make use of their pow ers under national law, SSM Regulation, art. 9(1) 
subpara. 3 (infra 3.2.2). Hence, the provision should be read as a broad power and oblig a-
tion to preempt NCAs completely. 
82 According to SSM Regulation, art. 28, the ECB will be responsible for devoting the 
necessary financial and human resources to exercise its supervisory functions. With regard 
to SSM Regulation, art. 6(5)(b) this could mean that the ECB has to hold available inter alia 
a buffer of qualified personnel that enables it to take over the supervision of less significant 
banks without delay that would otherwise result from hiring ad hoc.   
83 SSM Regulation, art. 30. - 16 - 
 
Even  though 
the humongous chal-
lenge  the  Commis-
sion’s  proposal  of 
direct  ECB  supervi-
sion  of  all  euro  area 
banks  (supra  3.2.1) 
would  have  meant 
has  been  superseded 
by  a  more  modest 
concept in the politi-
cally  consented  SSM 
Regulation,  the  size-
able  responsibilities 
conferred  on  the 
ECB  suggest  that 
much of the supervi-
sory legwork will have to be performed “close to the ground”. It is at least compre-
hensible that the forthcoming supervisory architecture seeks to integrate NCAs in 
order to capitalize on their knowledge of national, regional and local banking mar-
kets, their longstanding expertise particularly with regard to the interpretation and 
application  of  (harmonized)  national  banking  regulation,84  and their advantages 
with regard to location and language -skills. As a consequence, the  ECB is tasked 
with devising a general “framework to organise the practical modalities” of the in-
terplay between itself and the NCAs not only with regard to the supervision of less 
significant institutions (supra 3.2.1) but also with regard to that of the euro area’s 
biggest banks that fall under its direct oversight.85 Hence, NCAs will also be tightly 
involved in the supervision of significant institutions,  starting with uncovering the 
factual bases for various ad hoc or ongoing su pervisory measures (e.g. on site-
verifications, evaluation of internal risk models),  up to and including drafting deci-
sions for the ECB.86 Moreover, the ECB will have to rely on NCAs when it comes to 
enforcing prudential regulation as it can impose administrative sanctions auton o-
mously only  if banks breach directly applicable E .U.-law,87 i.e. violate regulations 
                                            
84 See also infra 3.3.1.1. 
85 SSM Regulation, art. 6(7). 
86 SSM Regulation, art. 6(7)(b). The literature has voiced concerns that even tasking 
NCAs with preparatory work for ECB supervisory decisions may constitute an impermissible 
delegation of discretionary powers, Ferran and Babis (2013, p. 11) pointing to ECJ, Case 
9/56, Meroni v. High Authority, 1958 E.C.R. 133. Yet, this seems debatable; for a very gen-
erous approach see also Wymeersch (2012, p. 7, 10, 11 note 35, 12) . The tight grip of the 
ECB on NCAs’ auxiliary services and its unfettered competence to render the final supervi-
sory decision warrant to doubt that the issue does pertain to NCAs’ discretionary powers. 
Moreover, it is not an exercise of hair-splitting that the competences NCAs retain as circum-
scribed in the SSM Regulation have never been conferred on the ECB by a regulation under 
TFEU, art. 127(6), i.e. no administrative (re-)delegation occurs.   
87 SSM Regulation, art. 18(1) allows for a  punative disgorgement of actual or  esti-
mated profits. 
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(TFEU, art. 288(2)), but can only require NCAs to open proceedings if banks violate 
(harmonized)  national  law  thereby  coercing  reluctant  NCAs  into  quasi-
representative actions.88 
More generally, the ECB can always push NCAs to take the actions  necessary 
to carry out the tasks conferred on it by issuing instructions.89 However, any form of 
such  “compelled  cooperation”  makes  daily  operations  arduous  and  thus  raises 
doubts with regard to the effectiveness of the new regime. The latter can hardly be 
dispelled by reference to the anemic legal obligation to cooperate within the SSM.90  
3.2.3 SUBSIDIARIES AND BRANCHES 
It has been argued elsewhere that the distinction between subsidiaries and 
branches is unaligned with the actual risk structures in transnational financial insti-
tutions and that the considerable differences in the supervisory framework that fol-
low from it should be leveled.91 The SSM cannot remedy these shortfalls  entirely 
because it provides only a discrete distribution of supervisory competences within 
the euro area but does not alter the pertinent substantive regulation.92  
If a significant institution from a participating Member State branches into 
another participating Member State, the ECB will be the sole supervisor,  i.e. it will 
not only carry out the tasks of the home but also those of the host supervisor (supra 
3.1 table 1).93 The supervisory tasks to be performed under the roof of the ECB, 
however, remain unaltered and thus diverge from those to be observed if a transna-
tional bank  conducts its foreign operations under a  subsidiary structure. Further-
more, the ECB will be the competent host supervisor if an institution from a non -
participating Member State branches into the euro area, 94 i.e. there will be a single 
host supervisor  even if branches are established in different  participating Member 
States. Finally, the ECB will serve as the home supervisor, if a significant institution 
from  a  participating  Member  State  branches  into  a  non -participating  Member 
State.95 
The ECB will serve as  both the consolidating supervisor and the competent 
authority in a subsidiary structure if the parent institution authorized in a participat-
ing Member State is significant.96 It is a consequence of determining whether a bank 
is significant at the highest level of consolidation 97 that if a significant parent estab-
lishes a subsidiary that itself would be regarded as less significant, the ECB not only 
                                            
88 SSM Regulation, art. 18(5) . 
89 SSM Regulation, art. 9(1) subpara. 3. 
90 SSM Regulation, art. 6(7). 
91 Tröger (2013 p. 199-200 and 220-1). 
92 For other area’s where the traditional distinctions based on organizational form 
will persist, Wymeersch (2012, p. 19). 
93 SSM Regulation, art. 17(1). 
94 SSM Regulation, art. 4(2). 
95 SSM Regulation, art. 4(1)(b). 
96 SSM Regulation, art. 17(2). 
97 Supra 3.2.1 at note 68. - 18 - 
 
assumes the role of the consolidating supervisor but also directly supervises the sub-
sidiary. Thus, contrary to the procedures laid out in CRD IV (supra 3.1 table 1), the 
ECB does not cooperate with NCAs in the consolidated supervision of significant 
institutions. The ECB also participates as the competent authority in the consolidat-
ed supervision of significant subsidiaries, if the parent institution is authorized in a 
non-participating Member State.98 
In sum, European banks will benefit to a significant degree from a centraliza-
tion of competences as the mere reduction of supervisory points of reference they 
have to turn to lowers their costs of compliance . Yet, from the policy maker’s point 
of view, a pivotal drawback of the regulatory regime survives: the supervisory tasks, 
methodologies and processes as determined by substantive banking regulation will 
continue to differ depending on the banking groups’ organizational structures and 
will not necessarily accord with banks’ actual risk structure. 
3.3  ASSESSMENT 
The literature that seeks to evaluate the evolving supervisory structures gen-
erally dwells on the tacit assumption, that the specific supervisory tasks will be per-
formed seamlessly along the lines of competence defined by the SSM Regulation. 
However, experience with national supervision teaches that in reality frictions occur 
where inter-agency cooperation is required and that interfaces between hub and 
spokes constitute potential fault-lines. To conceptualize expected losses in the sys-
tems overall effectiveness, it is useful to draw lessons from the political economy of 
administration and look at top-level bureaucrats’ incentives,99 particularly of those in 
NCAs (infra 3.3.1). From this perspective, it is important that the supervisory archi-
tecture provides not only sticks but also carrots. The SSM certainly provides a heavy 
club for the ECB to discipline NCAs. Yet, the perks that could integrate their top per-
sonnel in order to induce optimal voluntary efforts are less pronounced and ulti-
mately  hinge  on  developing  a  common  organizational  culture  within  the  SSM. 
Moreover, integrative elements partly have the potential to hamper swift superviso-
ry decision making (infra 3.3.2).  
3.3.1 LESSONS  FROM  THE  POLITICAL  ECONOMY  OF  ADMINISTRATION:  BUREAU-
CRATS’ INCENTIVES 
3.3.1.1 RELEVANCE OF NCAS’ CONTRIBUTIONS 
NCAs will perform at least preparatory or auxiliary services in establishing the 
factual grounds for supervisory decision making (direct ECB-supervision) or they 
will execute prudential supervision for less significant banks within the ECB-defined 
                                            
98 SSM Regulation, art. 4(1)(g). 
99 The underlying assumption is that the internal organization of public authorities 
allows motivating the rank and file to act —by and large—in accordance with the agencies 
general policies as determined by its top executives. In any case, optimizing the internal 
governance and incentive structures does not pose a problem unique to the context of inter-
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supervisory  framework,  under  the  permanent  threat  to  be  ousted  (indirect  ECB-
supervision).100 Obviously, the critical proposition underpinning such an institution-
al framework is that national supervision is generally more hospitable towards det-
rimental domestic interests, and that hence the ECB has to be established primarily 
as a “whipper-in” for NCAs who are seen with inherent mistrust.101  
It has been suggested here that the emphasize on strong powers for the hub 
vis-à-vis the SSM’s spokes is explicable by availability heuristics that look mainly at 
the most recent events that triggered the reform efforts and indeed exhibit egregious 
cases of captured and thus forbearing NCAs.102 Understandably, this focus becomes 
even more pronounced, as  direct supranational recapitalizations  through the ESM 
will be made expressly available,103 because the move arguably contributes to calm-
ing markets,104 but also exacerbates the potential for moral hazard. Yet, it could also 
be asked, if learning would have improved national supervision or whether  lax 
oversight is indeed necessarily associated with it. After all, in light of the severe eco-
nomic and social problems that currently shake, for instance Spain, Ireland, and Ice-
land, with hindsight, lenience towards national champions may not have been such 
a great idea—and may not be seen as such by the electorate in particular. Moreover, 
it was particularly the Bank of Spain that did well in discouraging massive CDO in-
vestments of the country’s largest cross-border banking groups who did thus compa-
rably well in the crisis of 2008/09.105  
These general policy considerations don’t have to be explored in detail as po-
litical leaders have determinedly embarked on a trajectory of more centralization in 
prudential supervision. However, it should be kept in mind that the evolving struc-
ture of semi-strong centralization with (critical) NCA-involvement has the potential 
for problems that may not only cancel out some of the advantages of centralization 
but also make its key advantage, forestalling forbearance of captured NCAs, partly 
unachievable.  
The literature recognizes that taping local knowledge about domestic markets, 
administrative practices, law etc. that resides in NCAs is important.106 If indeed the 
contribution of NCAs is vital for the SSM’s overall effectiveness, the query becomes 
whether public officers at NCAs, i.e. agents who actually discharge the duties vested 
with  their  supervisory  authorities,  who  either  offer  or  refuse  to  exchange  infor-
                                            
100 Supra 3.2.1, 3.2.2, and figure 2. 
101 For this rationale for centralization on the supranational level  supra 2.1. But see 
also infra 3.3.1.2 and 6.  
102 Supra 2.2. 
103 On the ESM‘s recently approved direct bank recapitalization instrument see Eu-
rogroup (2013); ESM (2013). 
104 Supra note 15. 
105 See Scott (2008).  
106 Sapir et al. (2012, p. 3); Goyal et al. (2013, p. 15); Ferran and Babis (2013, p. 11). - 20 - 
 
mation and collaborate with due diligence, are sufficiently incentivized to contribute 
to high-quality supervision.107  
3.3.1.2 BUREAUCRATS’ INCENTIVES 
To posit, that the success of the SSM depends on the incentives of (top-level) 
bureaucrats in charge at the competent authorities dwells on the realistic assump-
tion, that the public agencies involved should not be treated as black boxes that gen-
erate flawless output in implementing policy goals. From this perspective, it is im-
portant to remember the motivating forces identified in the line of research that ap-
plies methodologies from organizational theory to the political and administrative 
process.108 Methodologically, the object of investigation  can be scrutinized by using 
the analytical inventory of agency -theory: bureaucrats constitute agents who not 
only have some discretion that allows them to adapt to unforeseen contingencies, 109 
but also grants them leeway to take hidden action and pursue their own interest , 
because bounded rationality of principals—ultimate (citizens) or intermediate (legis-
lators)—prevents  the  writing  of  complete  contingent  constitutions  and  laws  that 
would secure the untainted pursuit of the common good.110 In fact, the intrinsic mo-
tives that are commonly identified as driving agency personnel in their exercise of 
office account for actions that serve the principals’ interest only sub-optimally.111 
According to standard analysis bureaucrats are driven by a desire to increase 
their personal power and to augment their prestige. 112 They thus seek to enlarge 
their agency’s size, competence, and right to intervene in the affairs of those falling 
within the scope of its mandate. They will discharge their duties in a way that allows 
them to acquire a favorable reputation among their peers, in the general public, and 
in the media. Moreover, opportunities to advance their future career in administra-
tion, politics, or the private sector motivate their behavior, which makes them prone 
to promoting the interests of those who offer the most desirable job opportunities in 
the long term and can result in regulatory capture. Finally, agency personnel seek to 
avoid liability for false actions or forbearance and will consequentially have a pro-
clivity to follow approved practices that can be verified in any review, even if new 
developments occur. 
                                            
107 Goyal et al. (2013, p. 14) recognize the importance of “incentive compatibility” 
between the ECB and NCAs. 
108  Programmatic  contributions  include  Tullock  (1965),  Weingast  and  Marshall 
(1988), and Moe (1991).   
109 On the positive aspect of “adaptive efficiency” North (1990, p. 80-1). 
110 For an overview of various political agency models see Besley (2006, p. 98-172).  
111 See generally Stigler (1971); Prendergast (2007). For the role of cognitive biases 
that tend to aggravate the deviation from desirable outcomes see Choi and Pritchard (2003).  
For an analysis with a particular view to the governance of financial supervisors  see En-
riques and Hertig (2011). 
112 Niskanen, Jr. (1971, p. 36-42). - 21 - 
 
To be sure, these observed preferences do not necessarily warrant a pessimis-
tic perception of bureaucrats’ effectiveness,113 but they highlight that these individu-
als are not robots that are automatically programmed to serve the public interest by 
quasi-mechanically enforcing prudential regulation, along the lines of legally devised 
competences, and free of self-interest. 
Analyzed from this vantage, the incentives to contribute to supervisory efforts 
within  the  SSM  are  potentially suboptimal, particularly from the perspective o f 
„subordinate“  NCAs. Both,  the  preparatory  and  information-gathering  services  in 
direct  ECB-supervision,  and  the  ECB-framed  oversight  over  less  significant  credit 
institutions represents anything but a gain in power or prestige for thus far inde-
pendent NCAs —particularly as they will be deprived of the competence to supervise 
systemic institutions.114 Ceding ground to the ECB may occur only reluctantly, turf 
wars loom large.115 Moreover, professional and/or political upward mobility on the 
national level is rather unlikely to result from good „auxiliary services“ discharged in 
the  background.  Vice  versa,  it  may  not  constitute  the  most  attractive  or  career-
boosting task that ECB-bureaucrats will perform with utmost diligence, to supervise 
a tiny euro area Member State’s three largest banks.  
In sum, incentives to voluntarily contribute with ample commitment to ECB-
led, high-quality supervision are not immediately apparent. To be sure, the problem 
will not be an open blockade or outright sabotage of the ECB’s efforts, but a lack of 
incentives to go the “extra mile” certainly impends. Proposals for an effect-based 
regulation that aligns supervisory competences as closely as possible with bureau-
crats’ incentives as long as political realities do not allow avoiding the thickets of in-
ter-agency cooperation altogether, have sought to address precisely the lurking lack 
of positive motivations.116 They are based on the insight that improving the supervi-
sory architecture does not only hinge on devising  clear responsibilities and hierar-
chies to compel close cooperation and dense exchange of information by law .117 To 
be sure, the ECB can rely on a set of tough enforcement tools in relation to NCAs118 
and does not have to put its hope in informal institutions that normally provide the 
only available  sanctions for non-cooperative behavior in transnational contexts.119 
But they only can be brought to bear where the ECB has detected or suspects deficits 
                                            
113 For at least ambiguous assessments of the complex web of incentives and its in-
herent trade-offs, see Levine and Forrence (1990); Tullock (1984). 
114 Tröger (2013, p. 218). 
115 It is indicative in this respect, that the Bundesbank —that participates in banking 
supervision in Germany—stresses that the SSM is based on the “principle of decentraliza-
tion” (!) and points to its network character, and thus, at least rhetorically, augments the 
position of NCAs, Bundesbank (2013, p. 16).    
116 Pistor (2010); Tröger (2013, p. 220-1) 
117 But see Goyal et al. (2013, p. 14, 15) who focus exclusively on “clear responsibili-
ties”, “strong oversight and accountabilities” of NCA’s and argue that ECB early intervention 
powers “provide incentives for cooperation” (id., p. 23), again relying exclusively on the 
stick for motivation. 
118 Supra 3.2.1 and 3.2.2. 
119 For an account of the self-enforcing mechanisms that international law normally 
has to rely on Guzman (2008, p. 33-48). - 22 - 
 
in a NCA’s supervisory practice. If bureaucrats in NCAs are not positively incentiv-
ized to voluntarily unveil deficits that their idiosyncratic know-how allows them to 
detect, even the most plausible advantage of supranational supervision, forestalling 
forbearance as a function of NCA’s “home bias”, is endangered, because the ECB will 
simply  lack  the  resources  to  generally  investigate  daily  supervisory  practices  of 
NCAs.120 
3.3.2 INTEGRATIVE  PROSPECTS  OF  INTERNAL  DECISION  MAKING  PROCEDURES, 
ECB-SET FRAMEWORK, AND NCA-ECB CAREER PATHS 
Organizational theory has long embraced the importance of the top level’s 
benign reputation for respecting the legitimate concerns of subordinates as a center-
piece in inducing optimal commitments and efforts of a firm’s employees.121 Trans-
lated into the SSM-context, the ECB’s legally defined lead role within the SSM re-
quires complements that integrate NCAs and lead to a commonly embraced supervi-
sory identity within the SSM.    
3.3.2.1 INTERNAL DECISION MAKING PROCEDURES 
An important aspect of the integrative prospects that help achieve the goal of 
providing positive incentives for NCAs to contribute voluntarily to optimal supervi-
sory efforts within the SSM may flow from their representation in SSM-decision 
making bodies, most importantly the ECB Supervisory Board.122 This newly estab-
lished body will plan and ex ecute the ECB’s supervisory tasks123 and will be com-
posed of a Chair (external candidate) and a Vice-Chair (Member of ECB Executive 
board),124 four ECB-representatives not directly involved in monetary tasks, and one 
representative from each participating Memb er  State’s  NCA.125  This  composition 
makes for an overweight of NCAs in the Supervisory Board, because at least 17 of 
the 23 full members of the Supervisory Board will be delegates from Member States’ 
supervisors. It translates into a NCA-dominance of the Board’s decision making. Alt-
hough voting weights had been favored for all Board decisions during the legislative 
                                            
120 Ferran and Babis (2013, p. 11). 
121 Kreps (1990, p. 93, 125). 
122 Its creation is owed to legislators’ vow to strictly separate monetary policy and su-
pervisory functions of the ECB, SSM Regulation, recital 65 and 73, art. 25. In the same vein, 
the ECB is obliged to pursue only the objectives set out in SSM-Regulation, art. 1(1) (safety 
and soundness of credit institutions, stability of the financial system, and unity and integrity 
of the internal market), when carrying out supervisory tasks. On the ECB’s determination to 
effectively implement the separation in its internal procedures, Constâncio (2013). 
123 SSM Regulation, art. 26(1).  
124 SSM Regulation, art. 26(1), (3).  The goal is to further separate supervisory and 
monetary policy functions by limiting overlaps in top-personnel, cf. SSM Regulation, recital 
66; Ferran and Babis (2013, p. 13).  Commission Proposal SSM Regulation, art. 19(2) pr e-
scribed the Chair be selected from the Executive Board, accepting a far larger intersection 
with monetary policy functions.  
125 SSM Regulation, art. 26(1), (5). Where the NCA is not the central bank, a central 
bank representative can also be brought to Supervisory Board meetings. Howe ver, such 
twin-attendance does not impact on voting rights, SSM Regulation, art. 26(1) subpara. 1.  - 23 - 
 
process,126 the inclusive and simple solution prevailed: decisions will be taken with 
simple majority under a one member one vote-rule with a casting vote for the Chair 
in case of a draw.127 A weighted voting process only applies under SSM Regulation, 
art.  26(7),  where  regulations  are  to  be  adopted .128  Quite  importantly,  ECB-
representatives on the Board will have a voting capacity equal to  the median of 
NCA-representatives and will hence not be in a position to command decisions .129 
Furthermore, a  Steering Committee with  ten members and  up to seven NCA -
representatives will technically prepare Supervisory Board decisions,  i.e. draft the 
drafts etc.130  
In sum, despite the allocation of the most important supervisory powers at 
the ECB, the decision making process of the newly created Supervisory Board makes 
ECB-led supervision essentially a common activity of Member States. At first glance, 
this gives it significant integrative potential that could induce volutary colaboration 
within the SSM.   Yet, at least for bureaucrats from those NCAs that thus far 
supervised a significant banking sector autonomously, the mere participation in the 
decision making process on the supranational level arguably does not compensate 
the visual loss in power and prestige, despite the larger geographic scope of the new 
activities. Moreover, even the feeble integrative moment comes at the price of a 
rather bloated size of the S upervisory Council which raises doubts regarding its 
ability to act in a swift and determined manner.131  
However, the integrative capacity of internal decision making procedures  is 
also attenuated, as constitutional concerns arguably compel Governing Counci l in-
volvement in each and every ECB   supervisory  decision.132  This follows from the 
Governing Council’s character as the ECB’s ultimately responsible decision making 
body.133 The political compromise has not subscribed to the view that the relation 
between the Supervisory Board and the Governing Council is a matter of the ECB’s 
                                            
126 Voting weights had been favored by some Member States during the legislative 
process to reflect sizes of national banking sectors, Barker et al. (2012). 
127 SSM Regulation, art. 26(6). 
128 SSM Regulation, art. 4(3) subpara. 2 allows the ECB to adopt regulations “only to 
the extent necessary to organize or specify the arrangements for carrying out of the tasks 
conferred on it” by the SSM Regulation.  
129 SSM Regultion, art. 26(7). 
130  SSM Regulation, art. 26(10). The Committee will consist of the Supervisory 
Board’s Chair, its Vice Chair, one more ECB representative and up to seven NCA repre-
sentatives, according to a rotation scheme to be determined by the Supervisory Board. 
131 Goyal et al., 2013, p. 29; Ferran and Babis, 2013, p. 14. 
132 Commission Proposal SSM Regulation, art. 19(3) allowed the Governing Council 
to „delegate clearly defined supervisory tasks and related decisions regarding individual or a 
set of identifiable credit institutions“ to the Supervisory Board. This was deleted to reflect 
the Governing Council’s ultimately responsible under the TFEU and the ESCB and ECB 
Statute, infra note 135.    
133 The latter has constitutional status as it is codified in TFEU, arts. 129(1), 283(1) 
and the related Protocol (No. 4) on the  Statute of the European System of Central Banks 
and of the European Central Bank, arts. 9(3), 10(1), 2012 O.J. (C 326) 320 [hereinafter: 
ESCB and ECB Statute]. For a detailed discussion of the resulting conflict between well -
designed supervisory institutions and Treaty pre -settings that largely override expediency 
considerations, Ferran and Babis (2013, p. 14-5); Véron (2012, p. 6-7).  - 24 - 
 
internal  organiza-
tion and thus grants 
leeway  to  limit  the 
decisions  that  have 
to be brought before 
the Council.134 SSM 
Regulation,  art. 
26(8) provides for a 
procedure  that 
seeks to  uphold the 
separation of mone-
tary policy and s u-
pervisory  functions 
but also reflect the 
constitutional  r e-
quirements.  It  de-
mands of  the Gov-
erning  Cou ncil  to 
object explicitly to the draft decisions submitted by the Supervisory Board in writing, 
stating in particular monetary policy concerns, within ten days during normal times 
and 48 hours in crisis situations.135 If the Council objects, a mediation panel will try 
to resolve the diverging views among participating Member States, SSM Regulation, 
art. 25(5). However,  regardless of the outcome of the mediation, ultimately the 
Governing Council’s decision will prevail, i.e. in order to reach a supervisory deci-
sion the result of the mediation has to be adopted by the Governing Council (figure 
4).  
Of course, at least euro area Member States136 also dominate the Council. 137 
Yet, it is not NCAs and their top-level bureaucrats who are representing their Mem-
ber States, even where prudential banking supervision is vested with NCBs, because 
the Governing Council assembles the heads of NCBs’ monetary policy arms. Hence, 
the invariable involvement of the Governing Council weakens both the integrative 
potential that the internal decision making process holds, the speed and resoluteness 
                                            
134 Wymeersch (2012, p. 7, 10, 11 note 35, 12). 
135 The Governing Council can only approve or object to Supervisory Boards draft de-
cisions, i.e. it cannot amend and shape them according to own perceptions. 
136 On the situation of participating Member States whose currency is not the euro 
see infra 5.2. 
137 Again, the relation is 6 to 17, i.e. the President, the Vice-President and four other 
Members of the Executive Board on the ECB-side, together with the 17 governors of NCBs, 
TFEU, art. 283(1), (2) and ESCB and ECB Statute, arts. 10(1) and 11(1). 
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of decision making in the multi-layer governance arrangement,138 and the superviso-
ry expertise that ultimately flows into supervisory decisions.139 
The critical aspect is that the internal decision making process both holds in-
tegrative potential, as it provides for a broad and meaningful involvement of repr e-
sentatives from all participating Member States’ NCAs. Yet, this—together with the 
invariable requirement of Governing Council approval—makes arriving at an out-
come quite cumbersome. In any case, at least from the perspective of large Member 
States with a significant banking sector, a perceptible loss of relevance for their NCA 
persists. 
3.3.2.2 ECB-SET FRAMEWORK, AND NCA-ECB CAREER PATHS 
The SSM’s capacity to integrate NCAs and provide proper incentives for their 
bureaucrats ultimately depends on the ECB-set framework for the cooperation be-
tween ECB and national competent authorities and particularly how it is animated 
in day-to-day supervisory practice. It is a good sign, that the pertinent regulation 
which will be the backbone of the organization of common supervision, is currently 
prepared by joint ECB/NCA committees and working groups. Furthermore, mixed 
teams140 may provide an excellent opportunity to incentivize NCAs adequately and 
induce them to feed their expertise into common supervision. 141  To achieve  that 
goal, they have to be set up in a  way that NCA-representatives not only serve as 
drudges for the ECB gentry. 
 In a similar vein, the exchange and secondment of staff could, 142 if carefully 
designed, provide career-opportunities for NCA-bureaucrats inducing them to coop-
erate. More generally, career paths should be designed in a way that good superviso-
ry performances at NCAs may translate into upward mobility to the ECB, turning 
the SSM into a true unit for promotion purposes.  
4  COEXISTING  STANDARD  SETTERS - A EUROPE À DEUX  VITESSE IN BANK-
ING SUPERVISION? 
The  amendments  to  the  European  supervisory  architecture  also  affect  the 
EBA’s role, both directly and indirectly. The London-based authority will also re-
                                            
138 The process becomes even more complicated, where participating Member States 
whose currency is not the euro disagree with draft decision of the Supervisory Board. For a 
detailed description of the applicable procedure cf. infra 5.2 and figure 4. 
139 Ferran and Babis (2013, p. 14).  Commentators have expressed concerns that the 
Supervisory Board will be a practically powerless advisory body, Wymeersch (2012, p. 12). 
Yet, this need not be true. Some of the weaknesses in the governance structure may be “cor-
rected” in practice: as the supervisory expertise will reside in the Supervisory Board and its 
working-level staff, i.e. the ECB’s supervisory department, benefits from specialization and 
routinization may accrue, if the Governing Council‘s ultimate responsibility is executed by 
rubber-stamping draft supervisory decisions in normal times. 
140 SSM Regulation, art. 31(2) provides for an ECB arranged, mixed composition of 
supervisory teams. 
141  Goyal et al. (2013, p. 15, 27). 
142 SSM Regulation, art. 31(1). - 26 - 
 
ceive more clout as an operational supervisor. It will henceforth be able to request 
relevant information directly from financial institutions143 and will no longer have to 
rely on data provided by NCAs, particular to conduct stress tests on a s ound factual 
basis.144 Quite importantly, the EBA will retain its  powers to require competent au-
thorities to take supervisory actions145 and ultimately act in in place of the comp e-
tent supervisory authority146 also in relation to the  ECB,147 after the Commission’s 
plan to partly insulate the ECB from direct EBA-interference was not carried for-
ward in the political compromise.148 However, it seems unlikely that the EBA will 
                                            
143 The current legislative state is reflected in Amendments adopted by the European 
Parliament on 22 May 2013 on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament 
and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 establishing a European Su-
pervisory Authority (European Banking Authority) as regards its interaction with Council 
Regulation (EU) No .../.... conferring specific tasks on the European Central Bank concern-
ing  policies  relating  to  the  prudential  supervision  of  credit  institutions,  art.  4,  P7_TA-
PROV(2013)0212 [hereinafter:  EBA  Amendment  Regulation]  amending EBA Regulation, 
art. 35(6). 
144 The EBA conducted a stress test involving Europe’s 90 largest banks immediately 
before the severe repercussions that the Greek sovereign debt crisis had in the European 
banking sector became visible during the summer of 2011 (Tröger, 2013, p. 190-1) and con-
cluded that the bulk of participating institutions was sufficiently resilient due to high tier-
one capital ratios, EBA (2011a). Among other things, this experience shows that NCAs tend 
to report data to the supranational stress tester in a way that supports a strong performance 
of “their” national banks, see also Véron (2012, p. 6).  
145 EBA Regulation art. 17(4) and  EBA Amendment Regulation, art. 2(b) amending 
EBA Regulation, art. 18(3). 
146 The EBA may adopt individual decisions addressed directly to financial institutions 
if the competent authority, after having received a formal EBA-opinion, does not remedy a 
breach of directly applicable E.U.-law, EBA Regulation, art. 17(6), or take requi red actions 
in emergency situations, EBA Regulation, art 18(4). Both provisions will remain untouched 
by EBA Amendment Regulation. For purposes of the application of the EBA Regulation, the 
ECB in its supervisory capacity will be regarded as a competent authority treated indiscrimi-
nately like a NCA,  EBA Amendment Regulation, art. 1(a) amending EBA Regulation , art. 
2(2)(f).  
147 The EBA will also have the competence to ultimately decide quarrels between 
NCAs and the ECB in accordance with the procedure laid do wn in EBA Regulation, art. 
19(3), supra note 45 and table 1, as these provisions will remain unchanged by the  EBA 
Amendment Regulation. Yet, as the ECB assumes the role of home and host competent au-
thority within the SSM (supra 3.2.3), relevant disputes may occur only in relation to non -
participating Member States’ NCAs. EBA Regulation, art. 19(1) requires an explicit referral 
to the provision in Union law for the EBA to receive decision-making power. Hence, disa-
greement of NCAs with ECB measures within the SSM cannot be referred to the EBA.  
148  The Commission sought to allow t he ECB an explained non -compliance with 
EBA-opinions in emergency situations and disputes with NCAs, Commission  Proposal for a 
Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council  amending Regulation (EU) No 
1093/2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Banking Authority) as 
regards its interaction with Council Regulation (EU) No…/… conferring specific tasks on the 
European Central Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit 
institutions, arts. 18(3a), 19(3a), COM(2012) 512 final [hereinafter: Commission Proposal 
EBA Amendment Regulation]. The rationale was seen in the ECB’s independent status—
flowing from its role as central bank responsible for monetary policy—that prohibits inter 
alia subordination to other E.U. bodies, TFEU art. 130, ESCB and ECB Statute, art. 7. After 
all, E.U. legislation subscribed to a bolder interpretation of the constitutional framework that 
limits the unconfined independence requirement to the ECB’s monetary policy mandate. 
For a discussion see Ferran and Babis (2013, p. 24). - 27 - 
 
meddle  with  day-to-day  supervisory  activities  both  within  and  outside  the  SSM. 
Hence, the most important development seems to be related to the EBA’s core task 
as E.U.-wide standard setter. In this capacity, it will be confronted with a de facto 
rivaling institution (infra 4.1). At the same time its internal decision making proce-
dures will become more cumbrous and thus conjure up the peril of a standoff be-
tween rivaling blocks of NCAs (infra 4.2).  
4.1  EBA-RULEMAKING AND ECB-SUPERVISION COMPARED 
Another source of potential frictions in the evolving supervisory architecture 
results from the ECB’s relation to other institutions within the European System of 
Financial Supervision (ESFS), in particular to the EBA in its capacity as gap-filling 
rulemaker. At the outset, ECB (SSM) and EBA pursue different ends. The ECB and 
the NCAs enforce supranational and (harmonized) national banking regulation in 
the participating Member States, whereas the EBA devises binding regulatory and 
implementing technical standards (TS) to be adopted by the Commission that clarify 
and fill gaps in E.U. banking regulation,149 a task which is still critical for integrating 
actual supervisory practices  despite the i ncreasing harmonization of substantive 
banking regulation.150  
SSM Regulation art. 4(3) subpara. 2 stipulates  explicitly151 that the ECB in 
carrying out its supervisory tasks will be bound by the TS,  have to  consider EBA 
guidelines and recommendations in accordance with  EBA Regulation, art. 16, and 
be subject to a European supervisory handbook that will describe best practices in 
supervisory methodologies and processes.  
                                            
149 EBA Regulation, arts. 10-15.  
150 For a bleak account of differences in supervisory practices, regulatory arbitrage 
and “home bias” that could be observed under the Banking Directive and national supervi-
sion, Wymeersch (2013, p. 3-4). 
151 The clarification is owed to  the controversy surrounding the scope of the ECB’s 
independence, see supra note 148. - 28 - 
 
However, the query pertains to the de facto relation of the ECB-defined su-
pervisory  framework  (supra  3.2.2)  and  the  EBA-drafted  technical  standards,  its 
guidelines  and  recommendations  and  the  European  supervisory  handbook.  Alt-
hough the further does not generally have the quality of a source of law,152 it will 
practically shape the application of the pertinent E.U. -Regulations and harmonized 
national laws within the SSM , i.e. determine the law in action, event though not 
that on the books: the ECB will compel compliance with its own interpretation of 
supranational legislation by forcing NCAs to adopt its own position and construe 
national  implementing  acts 
in conformity with it.   This 
prediction does not neglect 
the  fundamental  difference 
between regulation and s u-
pervision.  Yet,  it  posits 
that—as  a  matter  of  prac-
tice— the ECB will be signif-
icantly  less  encumbered  in 
integrating  supervisory 
standards  than  some  com-
mentators  have  argued,153 
even  where  su bstantive 
banking  regulation  remains 
(harmonized)  national  law.  
This is even more likely, as 
the ECB can not only rely on 
pure fiat but also  on the ad-
judication of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) that consistently holds that Me m-
ber States’ courts and administrative agencies have an obligation to interpret domes-
tic legislation in a way that it conforms to E.U. law, both primary154 and second-
ary.155 As a consequence, the actual impact of the ECB -defined supervisory frame-
work is very similar to that of the EBA’s TS, guidelines and recommendations and 
the European supervisory handbook (figure 3). In fact, it goes even further as the 
ECB has sweeping powers to cram its interpretations down on NCAs (supra 3.2.1 
and  3.2.2).  This  observation  makes  the  ECB  a  de  facto  more powerful  standard-
setter than the EBA, because in relation to NCAs it can dictate the interpretation of 
                                            
152 This is only the case where the ECB is entitled to promulgate regulations (TFEU, 
art. 288(2)) as part of its supervisory framework, SSM Regulation, art. 4(3) subpara. 2 and 
supra 3.3.2.2 . 
153 Wymeersch (2012, p. 5) identifies the necessity to apply harmonized national law 
as a source of frictions that could compromise effective supervision.  
154 Case 157/86, Murphy v. Bord Telecom Eireann, 1988 E.C.R. 673; Case 322/88, 
Salvatore Grimaldi v. Fonds des maladies professionnelles, 1989 ECR I-4407. 
155 Case C-106/89, Marleasing SA v La Comercial Internacional de Alimentacion SA, 
1990 E.C.R. I-4135; Joint Cases C -397/01 to C-403/01, Pfeiffer and others v. Deutsches 
Rotes Kreuz, Kreisverband Waldshut e.V., 2004 E.C.R. I -8878; Case C-555/07 para 115 et 
seq., Kücükdeveci v. Swedex GmbH & Co. KG, 2010 E.C.R I-365 para 49.  
figure  4  -  EBA  and  ECB  channels  to  integrate  supervisory 
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harmonized banking regulation, at least as long as no challenge of its position is 
brought before the ECJ.156 
Of course, the ECB will not blatantly renege against EBA -set supervisory 
standards. However, it can go further and proceed more rapidly in its efforts to inte-
grate supervisory practices. Where binding TS  have thus far not  been proposed by 
the EBA it can   prescribe  the use of common methodologies or  processes in the 
framework it has to devise for the SSM. This road may become even more attractive, 
if the EBA’s capability to expedite the integration of supervisory practices becomes 
constricted as a result of amendments to the rules governing its decision making 
process in regulatory matters.    
4.2  EURO-AREA DOMINANCE OF EBA DECISION MAKING OR STANDOFF?    
The creation of the SSM also provides for a looming euro area-dominance of 
the EBA Board of Supervisors, i.e. the decision making body responsible amongst 
others for EBA-rulemaking. To be sure, representatives of the NCAs will remain the 
sole voting-members of the Board reflecting its character as a common institution for 
all 28 Member States. However, Commission Proposal SSM Regulation art. 4(1)(l) 
commissioned the ECB to „coordinate and express“ a common position of euro area 
Member States in the EBA Board of Governors for “issues relating to the tasks con-
ferred on the ECB by this regulation”. It is quite plausible that prudential regulation 
relates to the supervisory tasks conferred on the ECB and that SSM-participants thus 
were expected to be ECB-synchronized in EBA-drafting of TF etc.157  
However, the Commission proposed  no substantive change  to EBA Regula-
tion art. 44(1) subpara. 2 that requires a qualified majority for the adoption of draft 
TS and other regulatory measures.158 Yet, to prevent a walkover of non-participating 
Member States, the  majority requirements for the pertinent Board of Supervisors‘ 
decisions may have to be adapted accordingly. Hence, Parliament159 seeks to tighten 
the relevant thresholds by stipulating a double -majority requirement in addition to 
the qualified majority vote, as long as at least four Member States would not partici-
pate in the SSM.160  
Commission Proposal SSM Regulation art. 4(1)(l) was discarded in the politi-
cal compromise. But even without an explicit mandate for the ECB to coordinate a 
                                            
156 Cf. SSM Regulation, art. 24(11). 
157 Wymeersch (2012, p. 21). For a narrower interpretation of Commission Proposal, 
SSM Regulation, art. 4(1)(l) Ferran and Babis (2013, p. 27 note 169). 
158 Commission Proposal EBA Amendment Regulation, art. 5 amending EBA Regula-
tion art. 44(1) subpara. 2. 
159 Conferring supervisory tasks on the ECB pursuant TFEU, art. 127(6) requires only 
the consultation of Parliament in a special legislative procedure (TFEU, art. 289(2)), whereas 
the concurring amendment of the EBA Regulation will find its legal basis in TFEU, art. 114, 
and thus requires parliamentary consent in the ordinary legislativ e procedure (TFEU, art. 
294).  
160 EBA Amendment Regulation, art. 7 amending EBA Regulation, art. 44(1) subpa-
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common position, a proclivity of participating Member States to vote en-bloc may 
exist and be amplified over time with supervisory methodologies and procedures 
incrementally  converging  thanks  to  ECB  coordination.161  Hence, the  amendment 
championed by Parliament  arguably balances a looming euro group-dominance.162 
Indeed, it will quite effectively counter the peril that draft TS, guidelines and rec-
ommendations etc. were adopted that would be perceived as entirely heteronomous 
from the perspective of non-participating Member States.  
It need not be decided here whether it necessarily created negative external i-
ties if participating Member States —with sometimes relatively small banking sec-
tors163—could impose their views on adequate prudential banking regulation on dis-
senters. Euro area Member States may favor a different style of regulation, but there 
is no convincing evidence that their approach is inexpedient or even inimical. After 
all, the Commission was deliberately put in the position to weed out such outlandish 
regulatory blunders should they come out of the EBA.164 With that in mind, one is 
tempted to ask, if it was not the logic of the De Larosière-architecture with bolstered 
European Supervisory Agencies (ESAs), that individual Member States would have 
to accept majority decisions in order to achieve greater uniformity in regulation and 
its enforcement.165 To be sure, the situation with coordinated and hence rather stable 
majorities poses a largely unanticipated scenario and the geographical distribution of 
Europe’s  financial  services  industry  is  such  that  the  control  of  EBA-rulemaking 
would be external from the perspective of Europe’s foremost financial center. 166 
                                            
161 Ferran and Babis (2013, p. 27); Véron (2012, p. 8). 
162  This observation also explains the envisioned double -majority requirement for 
adopting supervisory decisions outside of emergency situations, EBA Regulation, art. 18, as 
long as at least four Member States do not participate in the SSM, EBA Amendment Regula-
tion, art. 7 amending EBA Regulation, art. 44(1) subpara. 3, which allows non-participating 
Member States to effectively block decision making .  Moreover, in matters pertaining to 
breaches of directly applicable E.U. law, EBA Regulation, art. 17, and cross -border disputes, 
EBA Regulation, art. 19, EBA decisions will be drafted by an independent panel that is com-
posed of the Board of Supervisor’s chairperson and six disinterested representatives from 
competent authorities, EBA Amendment Regulation, art. 5 amending EBA Regulation, art. 
41. Ultimately, the double-majority requirement feeds concerns surrounding the EBA’s ca-
pacity as a decision maker in supervisory matters similar to those scrutinized infra for its 
rulemaking function. For a discussion see Ferran and Babis (2013, p. 26); on the (unintend-
ed) consequences of Commission Proposal EBA Amendment Regulation, art. 5 amending 
EBA Regulation art. 44(1) subpara. 3, that made it very hard for non participating Member 
States to veto decisions, Wymeersch (2012, p. 23).   
163 In June 2011, the total assets of the U.K. credit institutions accounted for 23.6% 
in the E.U., those in the euro area for 62.9%, Véron (2012, p. 5). Ferran and Babis (2013, p. 
22) posit that the U.K. is „the location for almost 50 per cent of E.U. financial services busi-
ness“. 
164 The Commission can decide not to endorse or to amend a draft TS that exhibit se-
vere defects, particularly if they contradict “fundamental principles of the internal market 
for financial services”, EBA Regulation, recital 23 with arts. 10(5)-(7) and 15(5)-(7). 
165 High Level Group on Financial Supervision in the EU (2009, p. 46-8). 
166 See supra note 163. It is this indisputable situation which puts concerns into per-
spective that point to the double majority requirement’s tendency to give non-participating 
Member States disproportionate influence in relation to their number, population and eco-
nomic weight, Bundesbank (2013, p. 29). The latter indicators are simply less important - 31 - 
 
Still,  however,  the  focus  on  devising  an  institutional  setup  that  primarily 
seeks to prevent coalitions from prevailing with their preferences in EBA decisions 
may be misguided. The proposed double majority-requirement will also abet a pa-
ralysis of the Board of Supervisors and thus weakens the EBA’s capacity to integrate 
supervisory standards through TFs etc.167 The EBA’s ability to act will be severely 
encumbered, if no decision can be taken against either the ECB-orchestrated opposi-
tion of participating Member States or the resistance of non-participating Member 
States led by the Bank of England and its Prudential Regulation Authority. A plausi-
ble outcome will be that EBA rulemaking will attempt to paper over unresolvable 
conflicts by proposing rather vague TS etc. that allow implementing diverse supervi-
sory approaches while being in full compliance with supranational regulation.168 As 
a consequence, an incremental integration of supervisory practices under the auspi-
ces of the EBA may fall prey to this lurking standoff, whereas the ECB may proceed 
rapidly down this road by devising an ever tighter framework for the SSM.     
5  NON-PARTICIPATING MEMBER STATES 
The  SSM  represents  an  island-solution  that  is  initially  limited  to  Member 
States whose currency is the euro. As a consequence, the U.K. will not fall immedi-
ately within the remit of the SSM. Hence, the banking activities in Europe’s fore-
most financial center169 are fed into the transnational supervisory efforts only along 
the traditional lines of shared competences (supra 3.1). Obviously, on a micro-level, 
the stated goal of common supervision, to implement more uniform and integrated 
high supervisory practices and the general rationale for supranational izing pruden-
tial banking supervision (supra 2.1) speak strongly in favor of casting the net wide.  
On a macro-level, preserving the integrity of a single market where capital and se r-
vices flow unimpeded across national borders is pivotal fo r the financial services in-
dustry and the prosperity of European polities. 170  Hence, the SSM in principle is 
rightfully hospitable towards new entrants as it offers an arrangement of close coop-
eration non-euro area Member States can opt-into (infra 5.1). Of course, an assess-
ment of likely candidates for such a close cooperation cannot be limited to the a t-
tractiveness of the legal package, yet the limited participation rights in ECB supervi-
sory decision making suggest, that it is rather unalluring to submit to the euro area’s 
supervisory architecture without adopting its currency (infra 5.2). All in all, the pro-
spects of a broad participation of non-euro area countries are dim (infra 5.3).    
5.1  CLOSE COOPERATION  
Despite doubts relating to the lack of a sound legal basis for non-EMU partici-
pation, 171 Member States outside the euro area shall have the option to seek a „close 
                                                                                                                                        
than the relative size of the regulated industry which proxys a jurisdiction’s affectedness far 
more precisely. 
167 For a similar assessment see Ferran and Babis (2013, p. 27). 
168 Ferran and Babis (2013, p. 27). 
169 Supra note 163.  
170 Ferran and Babis (2013, p. 22). 
171 Carmassi et al. (2012, p. 3-4); Wymeersch (2012, p. 24). - 32 - 
 
cooperation“ and thus opt into the SSM as full-fledged partners.172 On request of the 
Member State the ECB will decide whether the preconditions for such a close coo p-
eration are met, to wit, if the legal framework allows the ECB to function as the 
primary supervisor in relation to the pertinent NCA. 173 The Member State commits 
for a three year period from the ECB’s decision and can request the termination of 
the close cooperation anytime thereafter.174 The ECB can suspend or terminate the 
close cooperation if a procedure to remedy deficits fails , particularly if the Member 
State does not ensure, even after receiving a precise warning, its NCA’s compliance 
with the ECB-set supervisory framework.175 Once again, the ECB is equipped with 
strong tools to reign-in insubordinate NCAs. 
5.2  SECOND-CLASS  SSM-PARTICIPATION:  NO  ULTIMATE  SAY  IN  ECB-DECISION 
MAKING 
The key aspect that makes entering into a close cooperation relatively unat-
tractive for Member States who do not—at least in medium term—aspire to intro-
duce the euro could follow from the ECB’s character as an institution of euro area 
Member States.  
Participating Member States whose currency is not the euro will not be direct-
ly involved in ECB-decision making at the level of the Governing Council.176 Hence, 
even though non-euro area SSM-participants are fully represented in the decision 
making process of the newly established  Supervisory Board,177 they will not take 
part in the  Governing Council’s ultimate determination whether supervisory deci-
sions will be adopted or dropped (supra 3.3.2.1 and figure 3).  
Non-euro area Member States in close cooperation who disagree with a draft 
decision of the Supervisory Board will only have a right to articulate their reasoned 
disagreement in order not to be bound by the pertinent decision if the Governing 
Council confirms the non-euro area Member State‘s objection.178 If the Governing 
                                            
172 Commission Proposal SSM Regulation, arts. 6(3), 19(5) conditioned the represen-
tation of  non-euro area Member States in the Supervisory Board on the ECB’s decision es-
tablishing the close cooperation. For a discussion of this position of non-euro area participat-
ing Member States, Ferran and Babis (2013, p. 20). 
173 SSM Regulation, art. 7(2). 
174 SSM Regulation, art. 7(6). 
175 SSM Regulation, art. 7(5). 
176 This follows from the Governing Council’s function as the ultimately responsible 
decision making body of the euro area’s monetary policy maker, defined in the TFEU and 
the ESCB and ECB Statute, supra note 133. For a discussion of the—largely unpromising—
routes to redress the problems without a Treaty change see Ferran and Babis (2013, p. 21-
2).  
177 SSM Regulation, art. 26(1) assigns a representative from each participating Mem-
ber State’s NCA full membership in the Supervisory Board. In light of the definitions in SSM 
Regulation, art. 2(1), (2), Member States that have opted for a close cooperation are thus 
put on equal footing with euro area members (see also SSM Regulation, art. 26(12) on the 
equal treatment of all participating Member States in the Supervisory Board’s rules of pro-
cedure), as has been urged by the European Council (2012c, p. 7). For a discussion of the 
evolution of the rule see Ferran and Babis (2013, p. 20-1). 
178 SSM Regulation, arts. 6 (8), 26(8). - 33 - 
 
Council does not honor the Member State’s concerns, the only remaining resort lies 
in  the  immediate  termination  of  the  close  cooperation  on  the  affected  Member 
State‘s request.179 If the non-euro area participant is opposed to an objection of the 
Governing Council that led to a change of the  Supervisory Board’s draft decision, it 
can submit its reasoned disagreement to the Council that will consider withdrawing 
or confirming its original objection within thirty days.180 In case of a confirmation, 
the participating Member State has the option to avoid being bound by the ultimate 
decision, albeit at the risk of the ECB terminating or s uspending the close coopera-
tion.181 In light of the incisive consequences of such a kick -out from the SSM, it has 
been suggested that the decision should be taken on the highest political (European 
Council) rather than on the more technocratic level (ECB). 182 Yet, the proposition 
was not seized during the legislative process, arguably because the decision is ce r-
tainly also one of supervisory expedience.  
Even if concerns over a pervasive discrimination of  non-euro area participat-
ing Member States may be unwarranted, also because they are prohibited as a mat-
ter of law,183 it is a significant difference, if a representative of the affected Member 
State can participate actively in the  Governing Council’s  deliberations  or  if  the 
Member State has to rely dégagé on the benevolent consideration of a position ar-
ticulated ex ante. This may be a bitter pill to swallow for those E.U. Member States 
who indeed wish to signal their good will to further the common cause as part of 
their quest to join the euro-club. Yet, it may well prove unacceptable for others.  
Moreover,  the  SSM  does  not  provide  a  credible  bonding  option  for  those 
Member States whose currency is not the euro if they seek to credibly commit to 
high  quality  supervision  of  their  banking  sector.184  As  the  option to leave exists  
and—even more importantly—participating Member States who fail to live up to the 
SSM’s supervisory standards may be expulsed, the SSM is not a lobster trap.185 
5.3  CANDIDATES FOR CLOSE COOPERATION? 
It was indeed a strong incentive to join the SSM, if the opt-in offered risk-
sharing and least-cost bank resolution through ESM backing.186. Yet this seems hard-
ly an option, as the ESM was established by an intergovernmental Treaty of the sev-
                                            
179 SSM Regulation, art. 6 (8). 
180 SSM Regulation, art. 6(7), 26(8). 
181 SSM Regulation, art. 6(7) subpara. 2-4.   
182 Véron (2012, p. 5). 
183 SSM Regulation, arts. 1(4), 26(12). 
184 The literature has discussed and advocated choice-based approaches where either 
jurisdictions,  Hertig  et al. (2010,   p.  181–89,  194–210),  or  individual  banks,  Mortimer-
Schutts (2005); Čihák and Decressin (2007), could opt-into a European regime of banking 
regulation and supervision. 
185 For a theory comparing irrevocable commitments to high regulatory standards  
(mandatory disclosure rules) with a lobster trap Rock (2002). 
186 Goyal et al. (2013, p. 29). - 34 - 
 
enteen euro area Member States outside of the E.U. framework and is thus not im-
mediately available for non-euro area participating Member States187  
Obviously, benefits associated with an opt-in can follow from higher supervi-
sory quality and restrictions on regulatory arbitrage, reduced compliance cost s for 
transnational financial institutions, and the termination of home/host-coordination 
requirements. However, these advantages largely accruing in the private sector may 
not compel governments to cease sovereign rights. Hence, it will ultimately hinge on 
a non-euro area Member State’s individual situation, if the option to join the SSM 
will be exercised.  
The  case  seems  stronger  for  Central  European  Member  States  who  have 
pegged their currency to the euro and have a financial sector largely dominated by 
subsidiaries of foreign banks.188 Supranationalizing supervision potentially counters 
the  preference of consolidating home supervisor s  to push for downsizing foreign 
lending  in  a  situation  of  domestic  crisis. 189  To  a  certain  degree,  even  non-
participating Member States will  benefit as free-riders from a dilution of the pert i-
nent preference, if the banking group’s parent is a significant institution authorized 
in a participating Member State and thus falls within the remit of direct ECB super-
vision.190 The ECB’s motivation to compel a deleveraging in foreign jurisdictions may 
be less strong as it does not only serve the clearly defined national interests of the 
group’s home Member State.191 Yet, the non-participating Member State will still 
remain an “outsider” vis-à-vis the consolidating supervisor and may, at least at the 
margin, improve its position by joining the club as a full member with participation 
rights.  
For political reasons it is hard to imagine that the U.K. will dare moving in a 
direction that may be perceived as approaching the EMU. However, it has to be kept 
in mind that the City of London has to swallow the bulk of centralized banking poli-
cy  output  anyway,  for  instance  in  the  form  of  the  comprehensively  harmonized 
banking regulation (CRD IV/CRR) that will bring, amongst others, bonus caps for 
bank personnel. In medium term, its choice will most likely depend on how its in-
terests will be affected by the SSM, even though it stays on the sidelines. Despite the 
legal obligation to abstain from any discrimination against non-participating Member 
States whose currency is not the euro,192 the described mode  in which  the ECB-
driven,  closer integration  of  supervisory practices  among  participating  Member 
States will operate (supra 4), suggests that widening gaps do n either conform with 
                                            
187 See Treaty Establishing the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) and ECJ Case C-
370/12, Pringle v Government of Ireland, Ireland and The Attorney General, 2012 E.C.R. I-
■■■. 
188 Wymeersch (2012, p. 23). 
189 Generally on the conflicting preferences of home and host supervisors, Fiechter et 
al. (2011, p. 18). 
190 Supra 3.2.1. 
191 In principle, the ECB cannot discriminate against non-praticipating Member States 
whose currency is not the euro, SSM Regulation, art. 1(4). 
192 SSM Regulation, art. 1(4). - 35 - 
 
the rationale of a single market for banking services,193 nor make life easier for the 
City’s cross-border banks who might ultimately push for a pragmatic accession to the 
SSM.  
6  CONCLUDING REMARKS (ALSO) ON THE BIGGER PICTURE 
The assessment provided here is primarily concerned with the likely effec-
tiveness of the SSM as a supervisory regime to improve steady state financial stabil-
ity, i.e. the adequacy of the institutional arrangement for normal times-supervision. 
It hence does not look at (important) concerns regarding the ECB’s accountability as 
a supervisor194 or the legitimacy issues regarding the special review process involving 
the newly created Administrative Board of Review.195 Furthermore, it is analytically 
indifferent with regard to the ramifications it has that a central bank will serve as the 
primary supervisor, i.e. it does not take into immediate acc ount negative spillover 
effects for the ECB’s monetary policy function that could add to the doubts.196 The 
institutional combination of supervisory and monetary policy under one roof puts 
the central bank in a position to avoid hard supervisory decisions, potentially even 
cover own deficient oversight, by easing monetary policy and thus modifying the 
focus on the inflation objective; it can also provide liquidity to banks despite their 
insolvency to secure price stability; it can refrain from withdrawing bank licenses if it 
faces losses as a bank creditor.197 In fact, the ECB has, at various stages during the 
ongoing sovereign debt crisis provided quasi -backstops to ailing banking systems 
through its instruments of monetary policy, e.g. by broadening the defini tion for 
eligible collateral against which it lends to banks, lowering the minimum credit ra t-
ing for this collateral, reducing the haircut/increasing the advance rate  for collateral 
banks presented, easing borrowing terms and conditions. 198 It is only the safeguards 
against such negative spillovers that  influence the analysis as the attempts to sep a-
rate the ECB’s monetary policy function from its supervisory tasks complicates its 
decision making process (supra 3.3.2.1). 
Other papers focus on the SSM’s capacity to attenuate the current instabili-
ties. As a consequence, these analyses evaluate the SSM essentially as a necessary 
precondition  for  direct  ESM-recapitalizations.  The  latter  arguably  represents  the 
cost-minimizing  mechanism  for  the  orderly  reorganization  of  Europe’s  troubled 
banks.199 However, if seen from that vantage, the SSM may actually exacerbate the 
too-big-to-fail problem in the long run, as larger bail-out capacities tend to produce 
correspondingly larger institutions whose growth may or may not be adequately 
                                            
193 For a similar view, Ferran and Babis, 2013, p. 22. 
194 SSM Regulation, arts. 20, 21.  For an extensive discussion of these issues Ferran 
and Babis (2013, p. 16-9). 
195 SSM Regulation, art. 24. 
196 For a general discussion of the issue see Goodhart and Schoenmaker (1995); with 
a special view to the EMU, ECB (2001) ; for an optimistic view of an insider Constâncio 
(2013). 
197 Pisani-Ferry et al. (2012, p. 11); Goyal et al., (2013, p. 14).  
198 For a chronology of the relevant measures see ECB (2011, p. I-IV)  
199 Goyal et al. (2013, p. 9-10, 20-21, 26). Already supra note 15. - 36 - 
 
controlled  by  structural  prescriptions  how  banks  should  separate  their  business 
lines.200  
The evaluation of the SSM ultimately depends on where the most virulent 
problems impeding effective prudential supervision  are seen, to wit whether it is 
indeed the avoidance of regulatory forbearance triggered by NCAs’ “home bias” that 
should shape the institutions of normal times-supervision. In this regard, the view 
that sees the SSM as a panacea seems to be influenced by availability heuristics. 
However,  even  if  avoiding  capture  is  key,  the  SSM’s  institutional  set-up  seems 
suboptimal (supra 3.3.1.2) and requires carefully designed integrative elements that 
provide the carrots to complement the sticks (supra 3.3.2). Moreover, it has to be 
kept in mind that it obviously becomes harder for local interests to capture a supra-
local supervisor.201 Yet, this doesn’t say much for instances where the interests of 
agents themselves are broader and may thus lead to potentially more devastating 
capture on a higher level.202  
The effectiveness of common supervision also depends critically on the inter-
play with the resolution regime, particularly with the institutions of the  SRM. Ulti-
mately, only the credible option to close down a bank without limit systemic conse-
quences lends momentum to supervisory authorities.203 Moreover, as long as resolu-
tion and the pertinent safety net (backstop) remain national, Member States would 
still have to bear (in part) the fiscal consequences of the decisions of foreign/external 
supervisory  authorities.  Any  arrangement  without  a  symmetric  burden -sharing 
mechanism obviously drives a wedge between participating Member States ince n-
tives  and  the  social  optimum. 204  In  fact,  the  query  becomes,  whether  SSM -
participation without concurring SRM-membership will be possible or not.  
The latter is just evolving, 205 the outcome of the legislative process far from 
clear. The ECB has sound reasons not to become involved in resolution that will a l-
ways tend to have fiscal impli cations (bail-out). Yet, if for that matter, resolution 
powers will not be vested with the ECB, the separate resolution authority will also 
have to have additional supervisory powers necessary to facilitate early intervention, 
                                            
200 High Level Expert Group on reforming the structure of the EU banking sector 
(2012). 
201 Agarwal et al.  (2012) show that U.S. federal supervisors observe more stringent 
supervisory practices than state authorities. 
202 See e.g. Macey (2013, p. ) for a deeply pessimistic account of the SEC being captu-
red by Wall Street.  
203 Sapir et al. (2012, p. 2, 5-6) who point to the post Lehman-experience where au-
thorities refrained from closing down banks for lack of operable resolution regimes that 
would limit contagion and provide for adequate loss allocation and burden sharing; see also 
Goyal et al. (2013 p. 12); Ferran and Babis (2013, p. 8-9). 
204 Goyal et al. (2013 p. 12, 22). 
205 See Commission Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the 
Council establishing uniform rules and a uniform procedure for the resolution of credit i n-
stitutions and certain investment firms in the framework of a Single Resolution Mechanism 
and a Single Bank Resolution Fund and amending Regulation (EU) No  1093/2010 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council, COM(2013) 520 final.  - 37 - 
 
orderly reorganization, and resolution.206 It is hard to imagine that the envisioned 
participation of the Chair of the European Resolution Authority in the Supervisory 
Board’s meetings207 will solve all the looming coordination problems: the ECB will 
be tasked with early intervention,208 and will be in the position to pull the plug. 209 It 
is also competent to oversee recovery planning .210 Yet, the precise scope of  its in-
volvement in resolution planning remains unclear, i.e. there is no clear-cut division 
of labor with resolution authorities, leaving a critical challenge to be worked-out in 
the future.    
                                            
206 Pisani-Ferry et al. (2012, p. 11). 
207 SSM Regulation, recital 70. 
208 SSM Regulation, art. 4(1)(i), 16(1). 
209 SSM Regulation, art. 4(1)(a), 14(5), (5). 
210 SSM Regulation, art. 4(1)(h). - 38 - 
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